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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the role of information frictions in the design of financial securities,
the pricing of securities, and their business cycle implications.
The first essay studies the risk- shifting problem between bondholders and shareholders,
and the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the manager. Although, these two
problems have been studied separately, my model is the first tractable frame-work to study
these two frictions jointly. Using my model, I explore: i) How the presence of managerial
moral hazard affects the risk-shifting problem, and ii) How optimal policies of the firm
change in terms of leverage, managerial compensation, and investment decisions when the
two problems are considered jointly. I show that the optimal amount of risk-shifting is
amplified in the presence of managerial moral hazard. Moreover, my model delivers a
non-monotonic relation between risk-shifting and leverage. This non- monotonicity has the
potential to reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence on the sign of this relation.
The second essay (coauthored with Jianjun Miao) studies the design of an optimal con-
tract for the manager when the shareholders are concerned about model misspecification.
The model delivers counter-cyclical firm level equity premium, and has interesting implica-
tions for security design.
The third essay incorporates accounting practices into models that generate business
cycles through borrowing constraints. I show that the interaction of accounting frictions
with the borrowing constraint has implications for the persistence and amplification of
macroeconomic shocks.
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1Chapter 1
Dynamic Moral Hazard, Risk-Shifting, and Optimal Capital Structure
2Abstract
I develop an analytically tractable model that integrates the risk-shifting problem between
bondholders and shareholders with the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the
manager. The presence of managerial moral hazard exacerbates the risk-shifting problem.
An optimal contract binds shareholders and the manager. The flexibility of this contract al-
lows shareholders to relax the incentive constraint of the manager when a good profitability
shock is drawn. Hence, the optimal contract amplifies the upside thereby increasing share-
holder appetite for risk-shifting. Moreover, some empirical studies find a positive relation
between risk-shifting and leverage, while others studies find a negative relation. The model
predicts a non-monotonic relation between risk-shifting and leverage and has the potential
to reconcile this empirical evidence. Implications for capital structure, business cycles and
executive compensation are also considered.
JEL Classification: D86
Keywords: risk-shifting, moral hazard, principal-agent problem, capital structure.
31.1 Introduction
Shareholders may have incentives to undertake risky projects with negative net present
value because they benefit from a positive outcome if things go well, leaving bondholders to
face the losses if things go poorly. This is the risk-shifting problem studied in Jensen and
Meckling (1976). At the same time, managers have the incentive to shirk (moral hazard)
when their effort is not observable. These two problems have been studied separately. In
this paper, I construct a model in which I jointly model the risk-shifting problem between
shareholders and bondholders, and the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the
manager.
Using this unified framework I explore the following questions: i) How the presence of
managerial moral hazard affects the risk-shifting problem, and ii) How optimal leverage and
managerial compensation change when the two problems are considered jointly.
I consider three types of players in the model: shareholders, bondholders, and a manager
(agent), all of which are risk-neutral. The manager is impatient compared to the sharehold-
ers and the bondholders. The cash-flows of the project depend on the manager’s effort and
the profitability of the project. The profitability of the project is time varying, random,
and its variance depends on the amount of risk-shifting chosen. The amount of risk-shifting
is observable and shareholders specify it in the manager’s contract.
Once debt is in place, shareholders have an incentive to increase the riskiness of the
firm’s cash-flows because of limited liability. If things don’t go well shareholders exercise
their option to default and walk away from their debt obligations. Bondholders have to face
the costs of bankruptcy. Moreover, they have rational expectations and correctly anticipate
the instances in which the shareholders will default. Therefore, the optimal capital structure
of the firm will trade-off the tax advantage of debt with the costs of bankruptcy that results
from risk-shifting.
At the same time, shareholders need to compensate the manager for her work. In
the case in which effort is observable, shareholders pay the manager her outside option
4immediately (since the manager is impatient), and she exerts effort until liquidation. I
solve this model in closed-form and obtain the optimal amount of risk-shifting, total firm
value, and leverage. This will be the benchmark model without moral hazard which will
serve as a reference point of comparison once I introduce the agency problem.
When effort is not observable, shareholders need to provide incentives for the manager
to work. Thus, shareholders design a contract that specifies required effort, deferred com-
pensation, amount of risk-shifting, and termination as a function of the observed history of
output. The firm’s output history determines the manager’s current expected utility, which
I refer to as the manager’s continuation value. The continuation value of the manager and
the profitability of the project are the two state variables which encode the contract-relevant
history of the firm.
The contract exhibits deferred compensation, in which the manager is only paid after a
sufficiently good history of output. Deferred compensation optimally trades off the cost of
delaying payments to an impatient manager with the benefit of postponing her compensa-
tion, thereby reducing the probability of costly termination of the contract. The contract
is terminated after the firm experiences low cashflows and the continuation value of the
manager hits zero. At this point it is not possible to provide incentives for the manager to
work, and it is necessary to replace the manager. Since replacing the manager is costly, it
is natural to interpret the continuation value of the manager as a proxy for financial slack.
Moreover, because equity is more sensitive to financial distress than debt, financial distress
and leverage move in the same direction.
The model yields the following results. First, the optimal amount of risk-shifting in the
presence of managerial moral hazard is larger than in the benchmark case without moral
hazard. There are two effects causing this result, which I call: i) leverage effect and ii)
internal hedging effect. The leverage effect states that highly levered firms (i.e. firms closer
to default) have a greater incentive to engage in risk-shifting activities. Since equity can
be viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets with strike price zero, firms that are closer
5to default benefit more from the convexity of the call option if the risk increases. Thus,
holding the amount of debt constant, moral hazard creates a deadweight loss which reduces
the total value of the firm. Consequently, leverage and risk-shifting increase.
The internal hedging effect emerges as a result of the optimal contract’s adjustments
to the manager’s continuation value in response to the realized profitability. Intuitively,
the optimal contract attempts to minimize the probability of liquidation when the firm has
a high profitability. Therefore, the continuation value of the manager increases when the
firm draws a high profitability, thereby relaxing the incentive constraint. Conversely, the
continuation value decreases when a low profitability is drawn. When a low profitability is
drawn there is no need for the firm to have an incentivized manager, since the firm finds
it optimal to default. Hence, the internal hedging effect is a result of the dynamic nature
of the optimal contract that allows shareholders to relax the incentive constraint precisely
when they need it the most. Consequently, the benefits from the upside are amplified and
shareholders find it desirable to engage in more risky activities.
Second, the model predicts a non-monotonic relation between risk-shifting and leverage.
This result has the potential to reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence relating
risk-shifting and financial distress. Eisdorfer (2008) shows that 1) financially distressed firms
increase their investment in response to a raise in uncertainty, 2) the investment undertaken
by financially distressed firms has negative NPV. Together, he interprets these findings as
evidence of a positive relation between risk-shifting and financial distress. In contrast, Rauh
(2009) compares the asset allocation of pension funds across firms. He finds that firms with
poorly funded pension plans and low credit ratings invest a greater share of their portfolios in
safer securities such as government bonds and cash, while firms with well-funded plans and
high credit ratings allocate a larger proportion to riskier assets such as stocks. Therefore,
risk-shifting seems to be negatively related to financial distress.
In this model risk-shifting is initially increasing in leverage as documented by Eisdorfer
(2008), but decreases for high levels of leverage as in Rauh (2009). Intuitively, when the
6continuation value of the agent is low, there is little room to punish the agent in response
to a bad realization. This limits the scope to compensate the agent in response to a good
realization.1 As a consequence, the internal hedging effect is weak when the continuation
value of the manager is low, making risk-shifting lower. Similarly, when the continuation
value of the agent is large, there is no need to provide rewards in response to a good shock,
since the probability of inefficient liquidation is already low. Hence, the internal hedging
effect is not active for large values of the continuation value. However, for intermediate
values of the continuation value, the contract inflicts large punishments to the manager
in bad states, and provides high rewards for the manager in good states. The internal
hedging effect is stronger for firms with intermediate levels of financial distress. Hence, this
mechanism induces a non-monotonic relation between risk-shifting and financial distress.
This model’s prediction implies that in the presence of managerial moral hazard standard
linear models relating risk-shifting to measures of financial distress are misspecified, and a
non-linear relation should be estimated instead.
Third, firms in which there is greater concern for moral hazard issue less debt, and
choose lower levels of leverage. As discussed above, moral hazard increases risk-shifting
thereby increasing the expected costs of bankruptcy. In anticipation of these bankruptcy
costs bondholders reduce their demand for debt, making debt financing more costly for the
firm. Thus, the firm finds it optimal to reduce the risk-shifting incentives of the shareholders
by issuing less debt, thereby lowering initial leverage.
Fourth, the model illustrates a potential amplification mechanism of output shocks via
counter-cyclical risk-shifting. Since the optimal contract exhibits deferred compensation for
the manager, her continuation value on average tends to increase. This brings the firm away
from financial distress. When firms are not financially distressed leverage and risk-shifting
are low. However, a sufficiently bad sequence of output shocks erodes the continuation
value of the manager and brings the firm into financial distress. As a consequence, the firm
1In order to satisfy the promise keeping constraint, rewards in some states have to be balanced out with
punishments in other states.
7increases its amount of risk shifting, making the probability of filing for bankruptcy all the
more likely. Thus, the initial negative shock is amplified by the aggregate deadweight cost
of bankruptcy.
Finally, the model implies a compensation structure for the manager in which she is
rewarded for events outside of her control. While the manager has no control over the
outcome resulting from the risk-shifting action, her continuation value is increased in re-
sponse to a good draw, and decreased in response to a bad one. In this sense, my model
is consistent with the empirical evidence of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) document-
ing that managerial wealth responds to “lucky shocks” such as increments in oil prices,
or changes in exchange rates. The model implies that, on average, the manager will be
rewarded in response to shocks after a bad recent history of output, and punished after
a good recent history of output. Thus, the model implies rewarding managers for luck in
periods of financial distress such as recessions. I show that this “reward for luck” exhibited
by the contract is what induces a non-monotonicity between risk-shifting and leverage. In
particular, when shareholders are not allowed to reward the manager for luck, the relation
between risk-shifting and leverage becomes monotonic.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper belongs to the growing literature on dynamic moral hazard that uses recursive
techniques to characterize optimal dynamic contracts. I rely on the martingale techniques
developed in Sannikov (2008) to deal with the principal-agent problem in a continuous time
environment in which output follows a diffusion process, and on the extension to point
processes developed by Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) in the context of optimal mortgage
design. This paper is most closely related to the seminal work of DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006) and Bias, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet (2007) in which the agent is risk-neutral but
has limited liability. The main contribution of this paper is to integrate the risk-shifting
problem into their framework and use it to explore the interaction between moral hazard and
8risk-shifting, the implications for capital structure, executive compensation, and business
cycle amplification.
DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2010) and Bias, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villanueve
(2010) embed investment with adjustment costs into the principal-agent problem. They find
that financially constrained firms have lower investment rates, and that investment is below
the first best benchmark when moral hazard is absent. The key difference with my paper
is that they consider risk-less investment while I focus on risky investments which can be
desirable for shareholders protected by limited liability in the presence of debt commitments.
He (2011) studies the optimal capital structure of the firm when the manager influences the
growth rate of the firm. He find that the debt-overhang effect on the managerial incentives
lowers optimal leverage.
In the context of dynamic models of risk-shifting, Leland (1998) finds that the costs of
the risk-shifting problem are small when compared to the tax advantage of debt, and should
not affect the leverage choice significantly. Ericsson (2000) reaches the opposite conclusion
and shows that risk-shifting can lower the firm’s optimal leverage up to 20%. Both of these
papers suppose that managers behave in shareholder’s interest hence assuming away the
moral hazard problem.
This paper is also related to the literature that studies how managerial compensation
can mitigate the risk-shifting problem. John and John (1993) in a three period model show
that reducing the pay-to-shareholder wealth sensitivity of the manager in response to higher
debt can help her internalize the cost of bankruptcy, thus reducing the incentive to take
risks. Subramanian (2003) in the context of Leland (1998) shows that the managers optimal
compensation is proportional to the firm’s cash-flows, but subject to a ceiling and a floor.
Finally, the model is consistent with the empirical findings of Eisdorfer (2008), and
Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) who show that firms in which the interests of share-
holders and managers are more closely aligned engage in more risk-shifting. In particular,
Eisdorfer (2008) finds that firms in which managers hold a greater share of the firm’s total
9equity engage in more risky investment. Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) show that during
the great recession investment declined significantly as a result of the rise in uncertainty.
However, they showed that firms in which managers are compensated with options the
reduction in investment was substantially smaller.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 formulates
our benchmark case in the absence of moral hazard. Section 4 explores the moral hazard
case, and characterizes the optimal contract. Section 5 presents the results of the model,
and compares the results to the benchmark case without moral hazard. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the appendices.
1.2 The Model
In this section I lay out the model. I first present the players preferences, the timing of
events, and the firm’s technology. Then, I introduce the risk-shifting problem between
bondholders and shareholders. Finally, I describe the moral hazard problem between share-
holders and the manager and formulate the optimal contract.
1.2.1 Preferences, Timing, and Technology
Time is continuous and infinite. There are three types of players: bondholders, shareholders
and a manager (agent). Everyone is risk neutral and has rational expectations about the
future. Bondholder and shareholders discount the future at rate r, while the manager is
more impatient and discounts the future at rate γ > r.
The initial shareholders of the firm have access to a project with a stream of cumulative
cash-flows Yt that evolves according to:
dYt = atµtdt+ σdBt, (1.2.1)
where at ∈ {0, 1} denotes the amount of effort that the manager exerts, µt is the profitability
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of the firm, Bt is a standard brownian motion process with respect to the filtration Σt, and σ
is the volatility. I interpret µt as the underlying profitability of the project, which has initial
value µ0. Importantly, the profitability µt is time varying. The manager can choose from
a continuum of risky investments i ∈ [0, I]. By selecting investment i the profitability is
subject to a Poisson shock with arrival rate αi. Upon arrival of the shock, the profitability of
the project will jump to a new value that is drawn independently from a uniform distribution
with support [µ0− δ, µ0 + δ] where µ0− δ > 0. Moreover, the choice of i implies a flow cost
c(αi)dt which satisfies c
′(α) > 0 and c′′(α) > 0. The idea is that shareholders who want to
engage in risk-shifting will have to choose investments with a lower return.2 In other words,
by assuming a negative relationship between the investment’s riskiness and its net present
value I get rid of risk-return tradeoff. Thus, I focus exclusively on the risk-shifting motive
as the sole driver of investment choices. Formally, µt satisfies:
dµt = (µˆ− µ0)dJt, (1.2.2)
where µˆ ∼ U [µ0 − δ, µ0 + δ], J = {Jt, Ft; 0 ≤ t < τS} is a standard compound Poisson
process with intensity αt, and τS denotes the arrival time of the first (and only) Poisson
shock.
At time t = 0 the initial shareholders choose the amount of debt issuance. Debt is issued
once and for all at time 0. I assume that debt takes the form of a perpetuity that makes
coupon payments C per period and pays (1 − φ)µ/r upon the firm’s default, where µ/r is
the first best value of the unlevered firm. I interpret φ as the fraction of firm value that is
lost as a result of bankruptcy. I assume that debt is subject to a tax-shield ψ. Thus, the
optimal amount of debt will have to trade-off costly bankruptcy with the tax advantage of
debt. Once debt is in place, the firm is entirely controlled by the remaining shareholders.
The bondholders purchase this debt at fair value. The shareholders have limited liability
2Even though managers are the ones who ultimately choose the amount of risk-shifting α, because
this action is observable and contractible, it is equivalent to think of α as being chosen directly by the
shareholders.
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and default once the value of the firm is equal to zero. Once debt is in place shareholders
do not internalize the cost of bankruptcy imposed on the bondholders. Hence, bondholders
anticipate the instances in which the shareholders will endogenously default, and will price
in these expectations in their demand for debt. Thus, the value of debt D0 will be given by
D0 = E
[ˆ τ
0
e−rtCdt+ e−rτ (1− φ)µτ
r
]
, (1.2.3)
where τ is the endogenous time of default chosen by the shareholders.
1.2.2 The Risk-Shifting Problem
Shareholders value the stochastic cumulative cash-flows from the firm net of coupon pay-
ments and payments to the manager:
E
{ˆ min{τS ,τT }
0
e−rt(dYt − c(α)dt− (1− ψ)Ctdt− dPt)
+1{τS≤τT }e
−rτS
ˆ τT
τS
e−r(t−τS)(dYt − (1− ψ)Ctdt− dPt) + e−rτT F¯ (WτT )
}
,
where Pt are the cumulative payments made to the manager, F¯ (WτT ) represents the
payoff the shareholders will receive upon termination of the contact,3 and c(α) reflects the
decreasing returns of engaging in more risky investments. Once debt is in place share-
holders cannot commit to internalize the cost of bankruptcy incurred by the bondholders.
Thus, because shareholders have limited liability, they have an incentive to choose risky
investments. A larger value of α implies that the shock will occur earlier. Since the new
profitability is drawn from a mean-preserving distribution, a higher arrival rate α implies a
higher variance of future cash-flows.4
3In particular, if the manager is not replaced the shareholders will default and get zero. However, if the
manager is replaced F¯ (WτS ) will represent the expected profits from the new contract net of the cost of
replacing the manager.
4When µˆ is drawn from a normal distribution this property can be shown in closed-form solution. In the
case of the uniform distribution I use numerical simulations to verify this intuition.
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The managers will be instructed by the shareholders to optimally choose the amount of
risk-shifting as to benefit from the option to default when the realized cash-flows are low.5
Because of this conflict of interests between bondholders and shareholders, at time 0 the
optimal capital structure will have to trade-off the tax advantage of debt with the expected
costs of bankruptcy resulting from the risk-shifting behavior of the shareholders.
1.2.3 The Moral Hazard Problem
In this section I introduce an agency conflict resulting from the unobservability of managerial
effort. Recall from (1.2.1) how manager’s effort at influences cash-flows Yt. However, the
amount of effort the manager exerts is her private information, and shareholders need to
infer effort from the realized path of cash-flows. Moreover, when the manager exerts effort
at ∈ {0, 1} she enjoys private benefits at the rate λ(1−at)µt where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. I say that the
manager works if at = 1 and shirks if at = 0. Alternatively, 1− at can be interpreted as the
fraction of cash that is diverted by the manager for her private benefit, with 1−λ being the
the fraction lost by the diversion. In either case, λ captures the magnitude of the agency
problem, and it pins down the incentives required to motivate the manager to work. I also
assume that the manager controls the amount of risk-shifting α. However, the amount of
risk-shifting is observable, and that it is costless for the manager to choose an arbitrary α.
While the effort the manager exerts is not observable, it is realistic to assume that the type
of investment chosen is public information. For example, it is public information whether
a pharmaceutical company has decided to open a new R&D laboratory , or if a clothing
retailer is launching a new product line.
I assume that the firm’s cash-flows Yt, the profitability µt, and the amount of risk shifting
αt are observable and contractible. The shareholders design a contract (α, P, τT ) that
specifies the firm’s investment choice α, the cumulative compensation to the manager P, and
5Through out the paper I assume that managers are only responsible to shareholders (Allen, Brealey,
and Myers (2006))
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the termination of the contract τT ,
6 all of which depend on the realized history of output Yt,,
and of the profitability µt. Limited liability by the manager requires that dPt ≥ 0. Moreover,
if the manager’s saving interest rate is lower than the principal’s discount rate DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2006) show that there is an optimal zero savings contract. Under this condition,
it is without loss of generality that I equate the manager’s cumulative consumption with Pt..
Henceforth, denote an arbitrary contract by Γ = Γ(α, P, τT ) and relegate further regularity
conditions to the Appendix. I assume the shareholders and the manager can commit to
such a contract. Moreover, I assume that the manager can be replaced and that the cost of
replacing the manager is a linear function of the project’s profitability i.e. M = κµ.
Fix an arbitrary contract Γ, the manager chooses an effort process a as to maximize her
expected utility at time t = 0:
W (Γ) = max
a∈A
Ea
{ˆ τT
0
e−γt(µtλ(1− at)dt+ dPt) + e−γτTR
}
,
where A = {at ∈ {0, 1} : 0 ≤ t < τ} is the set of effort process that are measurable with
respect to Ft, and the manager receives utility R from her outside option if the contract is
terminated, irrespective of whether the shock takes place or not. For simplicity, I assume
that the outside option of the manager R = 0 for the rest of the paper.7 For the remainder of
the paper, I focus on the case in which it is optimal for shareholders to make the manager
work at = 1 at all times. Intuitively this is true when the private benefit the manager
derives from shirking is small compared to the gain shareholders derive from a manager that
works. In propositions (3) and (7) below I provide a sufficient condition for the optimality
of implementing work. For the remaining of the paper I use the expectations operator
E(.) to denote the expectation induced under at = 1 at all times. I say that a contract
6When the manager is not replaced termination is equivalent to liquidation τT = τ .
7Relaxing this assumption is straight forward but does not contribute much to the analysis.
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Γ = Γ(α, P, τT ) is incentive compatible if the manager’s expected utility is maximized by
choosing work.
The shareholders problem (upon debt issuance) is to solve the following maximization
problem:
max
Γ
E
{ˆ min{τS ,τT }
0
e−rt(dYt − c(α)dt− (1− ψ)Ctdt− dPt) (1.2.4)
+1{τS≤τT }e
−rτS
ˆ τT
τS
e−r(t−τS)(dYt − (1− ψ)Ctdt− dPt) + e−rτT F¯ (WτT )
}
,
s.t Γ is incentive compatible and W (Γ) = W0≥0,
where W0 is the initial expected utility to the manager.
8 Shareholders maximize the ex-
pected present value of firm’s cash-flows net of the flow cost associated with the risky
investment, the coupon payments made to the bondholders, and the payments made to the
manager. For simplicity, shareholders have the full bargaining power when choosing the
initial expected utility of the manager W0. Shareholders will choose W0 ≥ 0 as to maximize
their expected profits.
1.3 Solution without Moral Hazard
In this section I solve the case in which the manager’s choice of effort is observable by the
shareholders. This case will serve as a benchmark of the risk-shifting problem in the absence
of moral hazard. First, I solve for the equilibrium outcomes after the shock. Then, I solve
the problem prior to the shock, and characterize the optimal amount of risk-shifting in the
absence of moral hazard. Finally, I solve the initial shareholders problem and solve for the
optimal capital structure at time t = 0.
8For simplicity, I have assumed that the outside option of the manager is 0. It is straight forward to
generalize this framework to the case in which the outside option of the manager is strictly positive.
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1.3.1 Solution After the Shock
Assume for the moment that debt with coupon payment C is already in place. Later I will
find the optimal coupon payment chosen at the initial time. By assumption, the outside
option of the manager is 0. Since there is no moral hazard it is optimal for the shareholders
to pay nothing to the manager and implement effort at =1 at all times. I denote with
a hat the quantities after the shock. Recall that for simplicity I assume that once the
shock occurs, the profitability µ stays permanently at that value. Thus, after that there is
no longer a risk-shifting problem. Let Fˆ (µ) be the shareholder’s value function when the
profitability is µ. Fˆ (µ) satisfies:
Fˆ (µ) = max
{
µ− (1− ψ)C
r
, 0
}
.
The shareholders can choose to either receive the stream of cash-flows from the project net
of of the coupon payments, or default and get 0. Therefore, shareholders will continue to
service their debt if their profitability is large enough, i.e. if µ ≥ (1− ψ)C.
1.3.2 Solution Before the Shock
Let us now solve the shareholders problem before the shock. The shareholder’s value func-
tion F (µ0) solves:
F (µ0) = max
α
E
[ˆ τS
0
e−rt(dYt − (1− τ)Cdt− c(α)dt) + e−rτS
ˆ
R
Fˆ (µˆ)dU(µˆ)
]
.
The shareholders receive the projects cash-flows net of the debt payments and the operating
costs of the selected investment until the shock occurs. After the shock, shareholders get
the value function averaged out over the possible realizations of the shock, where dU(.) is
the density of the uniform distribution with support [µ0 − δ, µ0 + δ] . For the remainder of
this paper I assume the functional form c(α) = θα
2
2 . The parameter θ describes the rate at
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which riskier investments become less profitable. Large θ implies that riskier projects have
higher operating costs and tend to discourage the shareholders from selecting them.
I solve this problem recursively. The shareholders value function satisfies:
rF (µ0) = max
α
{
µ0 − (1− ψ)C − 1
2
θα2 + α
[ˆ
R
Fˆ (µˆ)dU(µˆ)− F (µ0)
]}
. (1.3.1)
The flow value of equity for the shareholders equals the expected cash-flows from the project
net of the coupon payments and the operating cost of investment, plus the expected capital
gain upon arrival of the shock. The FOC with respect to the optimal amount of risk-shifting
α is:
α =
1
θ
[ˆ
R
(Fˆ (µˆ)− F (µ0))dU(µˆ)
]
. (1.3.2)
The optimal amount of risk-shifting is proportional to the expected capital gain, and is
inversely proportional to θ. Plugging back (1.3.2) in (1.3.1) I solve for F (µ0) in closed form:
F (µ0) =
ˆ
R
Fˆ (µˆ)dU(µˆ) + θr − 2
√
θ2r2 + 2θ
(
r
ˆ
R
Fˆ (µˆ)dU(µˆ)− (µ0 − (1− ψ)C)
)
. (1.3.3)
Plugging this expression back in (1.3.2) yields:
αSB =
1
θ
[
−θr + 2
√
θ2r2 + 2θ
(
r
ˆ
R
Fˆ (µˆ)dU(µˆ)− (µ0 − (1− ψ)C)
)]
, (1.3.4)
where αSB is the (second best) risk-shifting in the case without moral hazard. In first
best shareholders would commit to zero risk-shifting. Since I have assumed that riskier
investments have a lower return, there would be no incentive to engage in risk-shifting at
all, thus αFB = 0.
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Figure 1.3.1: Initial firm value, and risk-shifting. Panel A plots initial firm value
for different choices of the coupon C. Panel B traces the relation between risk-shifting and
leverage as the coupon value changes. The parameter values are µ0 = 20, r = 0.1, γ =
0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ = 5, δ = 16
Panel B in Figure 1.3.1 traces risk-shifting and leverage for different values of the coupon
payment C. A larger coupon payment implies higher leverage, thus making shareholders
more exposed to the upside, but with the possibility to default on the downside. That
is, because of limited liability their loses are bounded, while their gains are unbounded.
Alternatively, we can think that highly leveraged firms want to “gamble for resurrection”
as they are closer to default. I refer to the mechanism by which leverage induces higher
risk shifting as the leverage effect. As it can be seen from panel B of Figure 1.3.1 the most
important observation from the benchmark case without moral hazard is that risk-shifting
is governed by the leverage effect. In the next section, we will see that the presence of
moral hazard creates a dynamic effect that amplifies the leverage effect and induces higher
risk-shifting.
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1.3.3 Optimal Capital Structure
In this section, I solve for the optimal coupon payment C. The initial shareholders need
to optimally split the firm into debt and equity as to get the largest possible value from
the initial issuance. The value of equity post-issuance is given by (1.3.3) once the new
shareholders take control of the firm. The value of debt satisfies (1.2.3), which implies that
debt is fairly priced. The explicit formulas for the value of debt can be found in Appendix
B. Formally the initial shareholder’s problem is:
max
C
D(µ0;C) + F (µ0;C),
s.t (1.3.3) and (1.2.3).
The optimal coupon payment will tradeoff the tax benefit of debt and the cost of bankruptcy.
Intuitively, for low values of C the firm can take on more debt as to benefit from the tax
advantage of debt. However, as the leverage of the firm increases the expected costs of
bankruptcy will pile up, and will balance out the tax benefits of debt. Panel A of Figure
1.3.1 shows a numerical example for the optimal choice of C.
1.4 Solution with Moral Hazard
In this section, I assume that the manager’s effort is not observable. Therefore, the optimal
contract needs to provide incentives for the manager to work. As in the previous section, I
start by finding the optimal contract, and the value functions after the shock. Then, I use
those expressions to solve the model before the shock. After that, I characterize the optimal
amount of risk-shifting in the presence of moral hazard, describing the main features of the
optimal contract. Finally, I calculate the optimal capital structure of the firm at time zero.
19
1.4.1 Solution After the Shock
Consider the case in which the shock has already taken place. The shareholder’s problem
consists of finding an optimal contract (P, τT ) that maximizes shareholder’s discounted cash-
flows, subject to incentive compatibility and delivering the manager her required payoff
WτS .
9 WτS is the manager’s continuation value immediately after the shock. The contract
is incentive compatible if the manager’s expected utility from τS onward given (P, τT ) is
maximized by choosing at = 1 at all times.
In order to characterize the optimal contract I write the problem recursively with the
continuation value of the manager as the only state variable. For a given contract (P, τT )
the manager’s continuation value Wt given that she will follow effort choice a is given by:
Wt = E
a
t
[ˆ τT
t
e−γ(s−t)(µsλ(1− as)ds+ dPs)
]
. (1.4.1)
That is, Wt captures the manager’s expected utility time t until termination provided that
she follows effort choice a. The optimal contract is derived using the techniques developed
by the seminal work of Sannikov (2008). Proposition 1 describes the dynamics of Wt and
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the contract to be incentive compatible.
Proposition 1 Given a contract (P, τ) and an effort choice a there exists sensitivity βt
that is measurable with respect to Ft such that:
dWt = γWt − dPt − µsλ(1− as)ds+ βt(dYt − µtdt), (1.4.2)
for every t ∈ (τS,τT ). The contract is incentive compatible if and only if:
βt ≥ λ. (1.4.3)
The first term in the evolution of Wt corresponds to the compensation required by the
9Recall the after the shock there is no more risk-shifting incentive, thus the contract after τS will only
specify payments to the manager, and a termination clause.
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manager from her time preference. The second and third term correspond to the change
in utility induced by the manager’s consumption and the disutility of effort. The fourth
term captures the sensitivity of the manager’s continuation value to the change in output.
Exposing the manager to the realizations of output provides her with incentives.
Condition (1.4.3) states that in order for the manager to work the sensitivity of her
continuation value has to be sufficiently large. Intuitively, if the manager deviates and
chooses to shirk (at = 0) for an instant dt, output decreases by µdt. Thus, the manager
incurs a loss of βtµtdt and gets private benefit λµtdt by (1.4.2). Therefore, working is
optimal for the manager if and only if
βtµ ≥ λµ or βt ≥ λ.
Let Fˆ (Wt, µt) denote the shareholders value function after the shock, when they have
drawn profitability µt , and the promised utility to the manager is Wt. I suppress the
dependence of the value function on µt to ease notation. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
show that Fˆ (W ) is strictly concave so that it is optimal to set β = λ. Intuitively, it is not
optimal to make the manager bear more risk than the minimal required for her to work.
Increasing the volatility of the manager’s continuation value will increase the probability
of inefficiently liquidating the firm. Moreover, since the shareholders can always make a
lump-sum payment to the manager it must be the case that Fˆ ′ (W ) ≥ −1 for all W. Let
W¯ be the lowest value such that Fˆ ′
(
W¯
)
= −1. W¯ will be a reflecting boundary at which
dPt ≥ 0. Therefore, the manager’s continuation value will always be between 0 and W¯ .
Proposition 2 summarizes the optimal contract after the shock:
Proposition 2 The shareholder’s value function Fˆ satisfies the following differential equa-
tion on the interval [0, W¯ ]:
rFˆ (W ) = max
β≥λ
µ− (1− ψ)C + Fˆ ′(W )γW + Fˆ
′′(W )
2
σ2β2, (1.4.4)
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with boundary conditions:
Fˆ (0) = max{max
Wreset
Fˆ (Wreset)−M, 0}, Fˆ ′(W¯ ) = −1, Fˆ ′′(W¯ ) = 0.
When Wt ∈ [0, W¯ ), the shareholders make no payments to the manager, and only pay her
when Wt hits the boundary W¯ . The payment dPt is such that the process Wt reflects on
that boundary. If WτS > W¯ , , the shareholders pay WτS − W¯ immediately to the manager
and the contract continues with the manager’s new initial value W¯ . Once Wt hits 0 for the
first time, the contract is terminated. At this point the shareholders can choose to default
and get 0 or hire a new manager and optimally restart the contract. The optimal contract
delivers a value of Fˆ (WτS ) to the shareholders.
Equation (1.4.4) says that the flow value of the shareholders value function is equal to the
sum of the instantaneous expected cash-flow from the project net of debt payments, plus
the capital gain induced by the change in the continuation value of the manager.
It is important to mention that in the cases when cash-flows are not large enough to cover
debt payments, shareholders find it optimal to default on their debt obligations immediately.
In the case with moral hazard that is equivalent to having the payout boundary equal to
zero. More precisely, I can show that when µτS ≤ (1−ψ)C the payout boundary W¯ equals
0. Thus, shareholders pay the manager her promised value WτS and immediately default.
I end this subsection by providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the manager’s
high effort to be optimal for any t ∈ [τS,τT ]. This condition is satisfied in the numerical
simulations.
Proposition 3 Implementing high effort is optimal at any time after the shock t ∈ [τS,τT ]
if and only if:
Fˆ (W ) ≥ γ
r
Fˆ ′(W )
(
WS −W )+ (1− ψ)C
r
,
for all W ∈ [0, W¯ ], where WS = λµγ represents the utility of the manager if she shirks
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forever.
1.4.2 Solution Before the Shock
As in the previous section, I assume that debt is already in place. Later, I will find the
optimal coupon chosen at the initial time. The contracting problem is to find an incentive
compatible contract (α, P, τT ) that maximizes the shareholder’s utility subject to deliver-
ing the manager her initial required expected utility W0. Recall that prior to the shock
the contract specifies a required amount of risk-shifting α, in addition to the manager’s
consumption P, and the termination of the contract τT .
Similar to proposition 1, I obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Given a contract (α, P, τT ) and an effort choice a there exist sensitivities
βt and {∆(W, µˆ)} that are measurable with respect to Ft such that:
dWt = γWt − dPt − µtλ(1− at)dt+ βt(dYt − µtdt) + ∆(Wt, µˆ)dJt + ρtdt, (1.4.5)
for every t ∈ (0,min{τS , τT }), where Et[∆(Wt, µˆ)dJt]=
´
R αt∆(Wt, µˆ)dU(µˆ)dt = −ρtdt.
Moreover, the contract is incentive compatible if and only if:
βt ≥ λ.
The first four terms are the same as in Proposition 1. The fifth term is new and captures
the manager’s exposure to the realized value of the shock. Once the Poisson shock occurs,
if the realized value of profitability is µt+ = µˆ the continuation value of the manager
will be adjusted by an amount ∆(W, µˆ). Because the contract specifies payments that
are contingent on the new profitability drawn, the adjustment to the continuation value
is different for each realization of the draw. The final term ρtdt is a compensating trend
required to deliver the manager her promised value. In particular, ρt is calculated such
that the last two terms have an expected value of zero. This condition comes from the
23
martingale representation theorem and ensures that Wt represents the expected utility of
the manager with respect to her information set at time t.
It is important to note that in principle the effort choice of the manager affects the
magnitude of the adjustments to her continuation value ∆(W, µˆ), from the perspective of
the manager these adjustments have a zero effect on her expected utility. If the manager
deviates and shirks, her continuation value will decrease. She will be faced with a different
set of adjustments, and a different compensating trend ρt. However, as discussed above,
the last two terms of (1.4.5) are a martingale difference with expected value zero. Thus her
incentives to shirk are not affected these adjustments. Consequently, incentive compatibility
of the contract only depends on the exposure of the manager to the realization of cash-flows,
and follows the same intuition as before.
Let F (Wt, µ0) denote the shareholders value function prior to the shock. In the sequel,
I supress the dependence of the value function on the profitability µ0 to ease notation.
Applying Ito’s lemma to F (Wt) using the dynamics of Wt given by (1.4.5) I find that the
shareholder’s expected cash-flow net of the cost of investment plus the expected appreciation
in the value of the firm is given by
Et
[
dYt − 1
2
θα2dt+ dF (Wt)
]
=
{
µ− (1− ψ)C − 1
2
θα2 (1.4.6)
+F ′(W )(γW + ρt) +
1
2
F ′′(W )σ2β2t
+α
(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W ))dU(µˆ)
)}
.
Shareholders want to maximize the RHS of (1.4.6) by choice of β, α,∆ provided that the
contract is incentive compatible and satisfies the promise keeping constraint. Assuming that
the value function is concave then it is optimal to set β = λ, as before. The inefficiency
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of liquidation provides the intuition why the manager should bear the minimum amount
of risk required for her to choose work. A higher volatility would increase the probability
of default with no extra benefit to the shareholders. Moreover, since the shareholders can
always make a lump-sum payment to the manager it must be the case that F ′ (W ) ≥ −1
for all W. Let the reflecting boundary W¯ be the lowest value such that F ′
(
W¯
)
= −1. I
now characterize the optimal choices of {∆(W, µˆ)}µˆ∈R. By concavity of F (W ) the optimal
choices are given by:
F ′(WτS ) = Fˆ
′(WτS + ∆(WτS , µˆ), µˆ), if WτS + ∆(WτS , µˆ) > 0
∆(WτS , µˆ) = −WτS , otherwise.
The optimal adjustments {∆(W, µˆ)} to the manager’s continuation value, which are appli-
cable when there is a change in the profitability of the project, are such that the sensitivity
of increasing the manager’s continuation value by one unit are equalized before and after the
shock. Because the shareholders have to deliver the manager her expected utility, the choice
of adjustments {∆(W, µˆ)} have to be offset by the compensating trend ρt. The shareholders
find it optimal to compensate the manager in the states in which it is cheapest for them, to
the point in which the cost of compensation is equated across states. Intuitively, the adjust-
ments are such that the continuation value of the manager is increased when the outcome
is good (high µˆ), and it is decreased when the outcome is bad (low µˆ). If shareholders get a
good outcome it is important for them to make sure that they can profit from it for a long
time. Thus, they need a manager that has a large continuation value, and is far away from
her liquidation boundary. In contrast, the benefit for shareholders of running a firm with
low cash-flows is small, thus it is not critical to have a manager with a large continuation
value. This feature of the optimal contract underspins the main result of the paper: the non
monotonic relation between risk-shifting and leverage in the presence of managerial moral
hazard. I call this mechanism internal hedging because it allows shareholders to minimize
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default (or costly replacement of the manager) when they get lucky, and thus benefit from
the high cash-flows for an extended period of time.
Finally I turn to the choice of the optimal amount of risk-shifting. The first order
condition with respect to α yields:
α =
1
θ
[(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W ))dU(µˆ)
)
−
ˆ
R
F ′(W )∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ)
]
. (1.4.7)
Similar to what I found in the benchmark case without moral hazard (equation (1.3.2)) the
amount of risk-shifting is proportional to the expected capital gain upon arrival of the shock.
Notice that the capital gain depends directly on the realized value of the new profitability
µˆ, but also on the amount by which the continuation value is adjusted ∆(W, µˆ). In the next
section, I dissect in detail the role that the optimal choice of ∆(W, µˆ) has in the choice of
α.
The following Verification Theorem summarizes the optimal contract before the shock:
Proposition 5 Suppose there exists a concave unique twice continuously differentiable so-
lution F (W ) to the ODE
rF (W ) = max
β≥λ,α,∆(W,µˆ)
{
µ− (1− ψ)C + F ′(W )(γW + ρ(W )) + 1
2
F ′′(W )σ2β(W )2
+α(W )
(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W ))dU(µˆ)
)
− 1
2
θα(W )2
}
, (1.4.8)
where ρ(W ) =
´
R α(W )∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ), with boundary conditions:
F (0) = max{max
Wreset
F (Wreset)−M, 0}, F ′(W¯ ) = −1, F ′′(W¯ ) = 0.
Then F (W ) is the value function for the shareholders optimization problem (1.2.4). The
optimal amount of risk-shifting α(W ) is given by (1.4.7), the optimal adjustments to the
manager continuation value after a shock ∆(W, µˆ) are given by (??), and the optimal volatil-
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ity to the manager’s continuation value is given by β(W ) = λ by concavity of the value
function. The continuation value of the manager follows (4) and the optimal payments to
the manager are given by
Pt =
(
W0 − W¯
)+
+
ˆ t
0
1{Ws=W¯}dPs.
such that the process Wt reflects on the boundary W¯ . Once Wt hits 0 for the first time, the
contract is terminated. At this point the shareholders can choose to default and get 0 or
hire a new manager and optimally restart the contract. If τS > τT then the remaining part
of contract will be given by Proposition 5 starting at WτS = WτS− + ∆(WτS− , µˆτS ).
Similar to the case in Proposition 2 the flow value of the shareholder’s value function is
equal to the firm’s cash-flows, plus the expected capital gain of the firm. However, the last
two terms in (1.4.8) are new. They correspond to the expected capital gain resulting from
operating the firm under a new value of µ and optimally resetting the continuation value
of the manager, net of the operating cost of the risky investment.
Panel A of Figure 1.4.1 shows an example of the value function F (W ), and two value
functions after the shock: One in which profitability µˆ is high and another for which it
is low. The arrows show the adjustments ∆(W, µˆ) to the continuation value in these two
cases. As seen from this example, the continuation value of the manager is increased
after a good realization, and it is reduced after a bad realization. Panel B of Figure 1.4.1
depicts the optimal amount of risk-shifting α(W ) as a function of the continuation value
of the manager W , and compares it to the amount of risk-shifting in the case without
moral hazard αSB. Panel C of Figure 1.4.1 plots risk-shifting as a function of leverage
L = D(W )/(F (W ) +E(W ) +W ) , and compares it to the leverage and risk-shifting in the
case without moral hazard. In the next section I will carefully discuss these results and
provide intuition for the interaction between risk-shifting and moral hazard.
The following proposition shows that the shareholder’s value function F (W ; θ) decreases
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Figure 1.4.1: Shareholder’s value function, Risk-Shifting as a function of W, Risk-
Shifting as a function of Leverage Panel A plots the shareholder’s value function before
the jump, and two shareholder’s value functions after the jump: one for the case of high µˆ,
and one for the case of low µˆ. Panel B plots risk-shifting as a function of the continuation
value of the agent. The dashed line corresponds to risk-shifting without moral hazard. Panel
C traces the relation between risk-shifting and leverage as W changes. The parameter values
are µ0 = 20, r = 0.1, γ = 0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ = 5, δ = 16, λ = 0.5, κ = 1, C = 12
28
if it is more costly for the firm to engage in risk-shifting, i.e, if θ increases. Intuitively, once
debt is in place, a lower value of θ makes it cheaper for the shareholders to implement higher
risk-shifting, thus raising the option value of the equity as a result of the higher risk.
Proposition 6 The shareholder’s value function F (W ; θ) is decreasing in θ for all W ∈
[0, W¯ ]:
∂F (W ; θ)
∂θ
= E
[ˆ min{τS ,τT }
t
−e−r(s−t)α
2
s
2
ds|Wt = W
]
≤ 0.
I end this subsection by providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the manager’s
high effort to be optimal for any t ∈ [0, τS ] . The parameter values used in the numerical
examples satisfy this condition.
Proposition 7 Implementing high effort is optimal at any time before the shock t ∈ [0, τS ]
if and only if:
F (W ) ≥ max
α,∆(W,µˆ)
{
(1− ψ)C
r
+
γ
r
F ′(W )(W +
rρ(W )
γ
−WS)
+
α(W )
r
(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W ))dU(µˆ)
)
− 1
2r
θα(W )2
}
,
for all W ∈ [0, W¯ ], where WS = λµγ represents the utility of the manager if she shirks
forever, and − ´R α(W )∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ) = ρ(W ).
1.4.3 Optimal Capital Structure
In this section I solve for the optimal coupon payment C. The initial shareholders need to
optimally split the firm into debt and equity as to get the largest possible value from the
initial issuance. The value of equity post-issuance is given by (1.4.4) . The value of debt
satisfies (1.2.3), which implies that debt is fairly priced. The value of debt is calculated in
the appendix, and can be calculated numerically as the solution to an ODE. At this point
it is important to notice that the value of debt and of equity depend on W0 as well as on
C. Recall that to simplify the analysis, I assume shareholders have full bargaining power
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when negotiating the manager’s initial compensation W0. Therefore, they will choose the
manager’s initial continuation value as to maximize their profits. The first order condition
for this maximization is F ′(W0) = 0. Formally the initial shareholder’s problem is to
maximize the initial value of the firm subject to the assets being fairly priced:
max
C
D(µ0,W0;C) + F (µ0,W0;C),
s.t (1.3.3) and (1.2.3).
As in the case without moral hazard the optimal coupon will tradeoff the tax benefit of
debt and the cost of bankruptcy. In general, the amount of risk-shifting is larger (see next
section) than in the case without moral hazard, and thus the value of debt will reflect this
increased probability of default. Hence the optimal ratio of debt to equity will be indirectly
affected by the magnitude of the moral hazard problem.
1.5 Results
In this section I describe the results of the model. First, I explore how the presence of
managerial moral hazard influences the amount of risk-shifting. I show that for a given
amount of debt, firms in which managerial moral hazard is larger also engage in higher
risk-shifting. Importantly, I find that risk-shifting is non-monotic in leverage. Second, I
study the optimal capital structure of firms with different levels of moral hazard. Firms
in which moral hazard is prevalent issue less debt, and have lower leverage. Since moral
hazard leads to more risk-shifting, bankruptcy costs will be greater in expectation. Thus, it
is optimal for firms to reduce leverage as a way to lower expected bankruptcy costs. Third,
I explore the implications of the model for managerial compensation. In agreement with
empirical findings the model shows that managers are rewarded for events outside of their
control. Fourth, I study firm survival probability and age effects of this model. The model
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implies that younger firms engage in more risk-shifting, and have lower survival probabilities
than older firms. Finally, I discuss the property of counter-cyclical risk-shifting implied by
the model, and how it contributes to the amplification and propagation of shocks in the
economy.
1.5.1 Risk-Shifting with and without Moral Hazard
In this section I discuss how managerial moral hazard influences the risk-shifting problem.
Recall that λ represents the manager’s cost of effort, and captures the severity of the moral
hazard problem. I will explore this problem in two steps: First, I will focus on the amount
of risk-shifting at the payout boundary W¯ .10 Under mild conditions, I show that α(W¯ )
converges from above to αSB as λ goes to 0. Second, I will fix λ and show that α(W ) is
greater than αSB. Moreover, I will show that the greater incidence of risk-shifting in the
presence of moral hazard is not entirely explained by higher leverage, and I will elaborate
on the role that the internal hedging effect plays.
1.5.1.1 Risk-shifting at the payout boundary
The model in section 4 converges to the model without moral hazard when the cost of
moral hazard λ goes to 0. Therefore, it is intuitive that the amount of risk-shifting in the
case with moral hazard will also converge to the amount of risk-shifting in the case without
moral hazard as the cost of effort goes to 0. Proposition 8 below formalizes this intuition by
showing that risk-shifting at the payout boundary in the presence of moral hazard converges
to the risk-shifting without moral hazard. Moreover, I show that when the cost of replacing
the manager is small, risk-shifting in the presence of moral hazard is greater than without
moral hazard, and thus that the convergence is from above.
10As I will show below, W¯ is the attractive point of the system. Thus, focusing on the amount of risk-
shifting near the payout boundary captures the risk-shifting that will be implemented a big proportion of
the time.
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Figure 1.5.1: Risk-Shifting at the payout boundary W¯ This figure plots risk-shifting
at the payout boundary for different values of λ. The parameter values are µ0 = 20, r =
0.1, γ = 0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ = 5, δ = 16, κ = 1, C = 12
Proposition 8 Let αSB denote the amount of risk-shifting in the absence of moral hazard,
and α(W¯ ) the amount of risk-shifting at the payout boundary for a given cost of effort λ.
Then:
1. α(W¯ ) −→ αSB as λ −→ 0.
2. α(W¯ ) ≥ αSB if ´ ∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ) ≤ 0.
Figure 1.5.1 shows an example in which α(W¯ ) converges from above to αSB as the manager’s
cost of effort goes to 0. I turn next to the study of what drives this result, and how risk-
shifting varies away from the payout boundary.
1.5.1.2 Risk-shifting: Leverage and Internal Hedging Effects
We had already seen from figure 1.4.1 that the amount of risk-shifting in the presence
of moral hazard depends on the continuation value of the manager W. Importantly, risk-
shifting α(W ) is greater than in the case without moral hazard αSB, and it does not vary
monotonically with either the continuation value or leverage. This has important empirical
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Figure 1.5.2: Adjustment to the continuation value of the agent ∆(W, µˆ) This
figure plots the adjustment to the continuation value of the manager as a function of the
realized profitability µˆ. Panel A plots these adjustments at the initial level of continuation
value W0 and Panel B plots it at the payout boundary W¯ . The parameter values are
µ0 = 20, r = 0.1, γ = 0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ = 5, δ = 16, λ = 0.5, κ = 1, C = 12
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implications because many models that try to estimate the magnitude of the risk-shifting
problem often assume a linear and monotonic relation between leverage and risk-shifting.
This model suggests that such models are misspecified. Rauh (2009) finds that firms pen-
sion funds tend to take on less risk when they are financially distressed. Similarly, Gilje
(2013) using corporate investment risk measures available in SEC disclosures documents
that firms reduce investment risk when leverage increases. In contrast, Eisdorfer (2009)
finds indirect evidence that risk-shifting is higher for firms that are financially distressed.
A similar finding by Landier et al. (2011) provides evidence of risk-shifting in the lending
behavior of a large mortgage originator - New Century Financial Corporation - during a
period of financial distress. Hence, my model has the potential to reconcile this seemingly
contradictory evidence: risk-shifting initially increases as the firms become financially dis-
tressed (and leverage grows), but it tapers off and decreases for higher levels of financial
distress (higher levels of leverage).
I will now explore why risk-shifting is greater in the presence of moral hazard and why
it is non-monotonic in leverage. Notice from panel C of figure 1.4.1 leverage in the case
with moral hazard is greater than in the case without it (for all values of W ). This is not
surprising as moral hazard decreases the overall value of the firm. Since I am holding the
coupon payment C constant, the value of debt stays approximately unchanged, and leverage
will increase. Highly leveraged firms benefit from having limited liability and profit from
the convexity of the payoffs induced by the option to default. This is the standard leverage
effect discussed in section 2 and it induces shareholders to engage in more risk-shifting.
However, the increment in risk-shifting is not completely explained by higher leverage.
Recall that risk-shifting is increasing in the expected capital gain for shareholders after the
shock. In the case with moral hazard, the optimal contract allows shareholders to make
adjustments to the continuation value of the manager in response to the profitability drawn
after the shock. On one hand, shareholders find it opportune to exercise the option to default
in bad states. Therefore, in response to a bad shock the manager is immediately fired and
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Figure 1.5.3: Shareholder’s value function, Risk-Shifting as a function of W, Risk-
Shifting as a function of Leverage (Without Internal Hedging) Panel A plots
shareholder’s value before the jump, and two shareholder’s value after the jump: one for
the case of high µˆ, and one for the case of low µˆ. Panel B plots risk-shifting as a function of
the continuation value of the agent. The solid line corresponds to the case without internal
hedging, the dotted line to the case with internal hedging, and the dashed line to the case
without moral hazard. Panel C traces the relation between risk-shifting and leverage as W
changes. The parameter values are µ0 = 20, r = 0.1, γ = 0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ =
5, δ = 16, λ = 0.5, κ = 1, C = 12
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her continuation value reduced to 0. The intuition for this result is that there is no use in
having a highly incentivized manager when you have a project that is not worth continuing
to operate. On the other hand, shareholders want to minimize the probability of costly
replacing the manager (or defaulting) when they have drawn a good profitability. Thus, by
reducing the manager’s continuation value in the bad states, shareholders have leeway to
increase W in the good states. The flexibility of the contract to make these adjustments is
what I refer to as the internal hedging effect, because these adjustments allow the firm to
internally hedge its optimal response to the profitability drawn. Consequently, the internal
hedging effect allows shareholders to maximize their expected capital gain after the shock,
increasing their appetite for risk-shifting.
Figure (1.5.2) depicts the adjustments to the continuation value of the manager ∆(W, µˆ)
in response to the realized profitability. Panel A depicts the adjustments when WτS = W0
and Panel B shows the case when WτS = W¯ . In both cases, the size of the adjustment
is increasing in µˆ. For very low values of µˆ the continuation value of the manager is
immediately reduced to 0 and her contract is terminated. For larger values of µˆ, shareholders
find it optimal to continue with the project, and relax the incentive constraint of the manager
in proportion to the new profitability of the project. As discussed above, the intuition for
this result comes from the desire of shareholders to minimize costly replacement of the
manager (or costly bankruptcy).
The internal hedging effect induces a non-monotic relation between leverage and risk-
shifting. Intuitively, for low values of W shareholders have very little room to punish
the manager, and hence cannot really profit from the option to default. If the expected
punishment in response to a bad shock is small, the optimal contract has little room to
reward the manager in response to a good shock. Thus, the internal hedging effect is
mainly inactive for low values of W. For high values of W there is no need to reward the
manager in response to a good shock, since the current value of W is already sufficiently
high and costly replacement is unlikely. Hence, the internal hedging effect is silent when
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W is close to the payout boundary W¯ . However, for values of W in the middle range, the
internal hedging effect is strongest, since it allows shareholders to benefit from the option
to default in bad states via punishment of the manager, and minimizing the probability of
default by rewarding the manager in the good states.
To better highlight the role of the interal hedging effect, I will preclude the shareholders
from making adjustments to the continuation value in response to the realized profitability.
That is, I will impose the constraint ∆(W, µˆ) = 0. Denote the solution to this problem
FNIH(W ), and the respective amount of risk shifting αNIH(W ), where the subscript NIH
stands for No Internal Hedging. Formally FNIH(W ) satisfies:
rFNIH(W ) = max
β≥λ,α
{
µ− (1− ψ)C + F ′NIH(W )γW +
1
2
F ′′NIH(W )σ
2β2 (1.5.1)
+α
(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W, µˆ)− FNIH(W ))dN(µˆ)
)
− 1
2
θα2
}
,
with boundary conditions:
FNIH(0) = max{max
Wreset
FNIH(Wreset)−M, 0}, F ′NIH(W¯ ) = −1, F ′′NIH(W¯ ) = 0.
Panel A of Figure 1.5.3 shows an example of the value function FNIH(W ), and two value
functions after the shock: one in which the value of the profitability µˆ is high and another
for which it is low. The arrows indicate that the continuation value of the manager will
not change in response to the shock. Suppressing the flexibility of the contract to hedge
against the shock by adjusting the continuation value shuts down the internal hedging
effect. Panels B and C of Figure 1.5.3 indicate that risk-shifting αNIH(W ) is monotonic
in the continuation value of the manager and in leverage. By suppressing the internal
hedging effect the standard intuition that higher leverage should induce higher risk-shifting
is restored. In other words, firms that are closer to default engage more in gambling for
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Figure 1.5.4: Initial firm value, and risk-shifting . Panel A plots initial firm value as a
function of C for three different values of λ. Panel B traces the relation between risk-shifting
and leverage as the coupon value changes. The parameter values are µ0 = 20, r = 0.1, γ =
0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ = 5, δ = 16, κ = 1
resurrection. However, that intuition is incomplete when the dynamic features of the optimal
contract allow shareholders to make adjustments to the continuation value of the manager
in response to profitability shocks. Hence, endowing the contract with this flexibility can
reverse the usual relation between leverage and risk-shifting.
This analysis suggests that the compensation package of the manager is an important
determinant of risk-shifting, even when risk-shifting is observable and contractible. Thus,
attempts to regulate risk-shifting by means of restricting leverage are not optimal. Policies
aimed at reducing risky activities need to look jointly at the leverage of the firms and the
contract that binds the management and the shareholders of the firm.
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1.5.2 Capital Structure and Leverage
In this section, I discuss how managerial moral hazard influences the optimal capital struc-
ture of the firm, and the optimal leverage. Panel A of Figure 1.5.4 plots the initial value
of the firm for different values of C for three different values of λ. As expected, the value
of the firm decreases as the incidence of moral hazard increases (higher λ). Moreover, the
optimal coupon chosen is decreasing in λ. The intuition for this result is that higher moral
hazard induces higher risk-shifting. Bondholders anticipate higher rates of bankruptcy as
a result, and thus will only buy this debt at a discount. At time 0 the initial shareholders
internalize the costs associated with higher bankruptcy, and decide to reduce the amount
of debt issued. Moreover, the reduction in the initial issuance of debt dominates the reduc-
tion in firm value associated with higher moral hazard and leads to lower initial leverage
L0 =
D(W0)
D(W0)+F (W0)+W0
. The model implies that firms in which there is more prevalence of
managerial moral hazard will choose a lower initial amount of leverage.
Panel B of Figure 1.5.4 shows the relation between initial leverage L0 and α(W0). As
expected, risk-shifting and leverage are positively related for a given value of λ. However,
higher values of λ imply higher risk-shifting for the same value of leverage. This is consis-
tent with the previous result that in a model with moral hazard, leverage is not the only
determinant of the amount of risk-shifting undertaken by the firm.
1.5.3 Managerial Compensation
In this section, I discuss the implications for managerial compensation arising from the
model. Recall the law of motion for the continuation value of the manager is given by
dWt = γWtdt− dPt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Promise Keeping
+ σλdBt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentives
+ ∆(Wt, µˆ)dJt + ρt.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Internal Hedging Channel
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The first term reflects that the contract must be consistent with the promise made to the
manager. In order for the continuation value W to appropriately capture the promise made
to the manager, it should grow at the discount rate of the manager γ, net of the utility
flow from the manager’s consumption dPt. The second term reflects the need to provide
incentives for the manager to work. The extent to which the manager is exposed to the
brownian shock has to be proportional to the cost of effort of the manager as to deter her
from shirking. The third term corresponds to the exposure of the manager’s continuation
value to the Poisson shock. This term is what I have called the internal hedging effect and
it represents the adjustments made to the continuation value of the manager in response to
the profitability drawn. This term is similar to what Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010) call “reward
for luck”. In contrast to output, the manager has no influence over the profitability drawn
upon realization of the shock,11 yet her continuation utility is affected by it. In that sense,
the manager is rewarded (or punished) by events that are outside of her control. This result
is puzzling in light of Holmstrom’s (1979) sufficient statistic result, as one would expect
the optimal contract to filter out “noise” from the compensation package. However, in this
dynamic setting luck shocks are informative about the future profitability of the firm, and
hence about the cost of providing incentives for the manager in the future. In particular,
by exposing the manager to this luck shock the contract minimizes costly replacement of
the manager or inefficient liquidation of the firm.
Empirically, reward for luck is present in many types of compensation contracts. Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) document that managerial compensation in the oil industry re-
sponds to “lucky shocks”, such as increases in the price of oil, or changes in exchange rates
for firms with operations in multiple countries. They posit that such reward for luck is
the result of managerial discretion over their own compensation schemes, and suggest that
the principal-agent framework fails to account for this phenomenon. In contrast, this pa-
per offers and alternative explanation for this phenomenon when modeling the risk-shifting
11µˆ is drawn from U [µ0 − δ, µ0 + δ] irrespective of the manager’s actions.
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Figure 1.5.5: Expected reward and standard deviation of the reward . Panel A
plots the expected value and the standard deviation of the “lucky” reward the manager
will receive upon realization of a shock. The parameter values are µ0 = 20, r = 0.1, γ =
0.15, θ = 50, ψ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, σ = 5, δ = 16, λ = 0.5, κ = 1.
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problem as a permanent shift in the profitability of the firm.12
I will now explore the optimal mixture of rewards and punishments implied by the
optimal contract. Panel A in Figure 1.5.5 depicts the expected change in the manager
continuation value upon realization of the shock
E(W ) =
ˆ
R
∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ).
For low values of W the manager is compensated with rewards. Because of the manager’s
limited liability, the optimal contract has little room to punish the manager, and thus on
average the manager’s continuation value increases. As the value of W grows the share-
holders have more room to punish the manager in response to a bad shock. Therefore, in
expectation the manager is punished upon arrival of the shock. An interesting implication
of the model is that firms with a recent history of poor performance (low W ) are more
likely to reward their managers for events outside of their control. Hence, the model pre-
dicts a counter-cyclical reward for luck of managers: in good times managers are punished
for events outside of their control, and in bad times they are rewarded.
Panel B in Figure 1.5.5 depicts the standard deviation in the change of the manager’s
continuation value upon realization of the shock
SD(W ) =
√ˆ
R
∆2(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ)− [E(W )]2.
The inverted U-shape of this function shows that the adjustments to the continuation value
of the manager in response to the lucky shock are more spread out for intermediate values
of W . This is in agreement with the findings from panel A: because of limited liability
for low values of W the punishment for the manager is at most W . Conversely, for high
12Hoffman and Pfeil (2010) were the first to show that optimal dynamic contracting can capture the
“reward for luck” effect. Their paper differs from mine in that the productivity shocks in their paper
are exogenous, while in my paper they emerge endogenous as a result of the risk-shifting conflict between
shareholders and bondholders.
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values of W there is no need to reward the manager in response to a good shock. However,
for intermediate values of W the optimal contract induces large punishments in response
to bad shocks, and large rewards in response to good ones. Importantly, spreading the
continuation value of the manager in response to the profitability is the mechanism that
actives the internal hedging effect. As a result, the non-monotonicity between leverage
and risk-shifting resulting from the internal hedging effect is directly linked to the non-
monotonicity in the variation of the adjustments made to the continuation value of the
manager after the shock.
1.5.4 Business Cycle Implications
In this section, I discuss the model’s implication for business cycle fluctuations. Recall that
under the optimal contract the continuation value of the manager W ∈ [0, W¯ ] follows
dWt = γWtdt+ σλdBt + {∆(W, µˆ)dJt + ρtdt} ,
where − ´R αt∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ) = ρt. Since the compensation to the manager is deferred until
W¯ , the evolution of Wt needs to appreciate at rate γ (first term), and from the martingale
representation theorem expose the manager to the brownian shock (second term) and the
Poisson shock (third term). These last two terms are zero in expectation. Therefore, on
average the continuation value is drifting upwards towards the attractive point of the system
W¯ .
On average the continuation value of the manager stays near the payout boundary,
in which firms face low financial distress, and engage in little risk-shifting.13 However, a
sufficiently bad sequence of output shocks erodes the continuation value of the manager and
brings the firm into financial distress. Thus, shareholders find it optimal to engage in higher
risk-shifting activities, which in turn raise the probability of bankruptcy. As a result, the
initial negative sequence of output shocks is amplified by the aggregate deadweight cost of
13See Figure 1.4.1
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bankruptcy.
Importantly, in the benchmark model without moral hazard presented in section 3 out-
put shocks have no persistent effect on the dynamics of the firm. In that case, the shock
is fully absorbed by the shareholders, but has no impact on the amount of risk-shifting of
the firm, nor on its expected probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, it is the counter-cyclical
nature of risk-shifting induced by modeling jointly the moral hazard and the risk-shifting
problem that underpins this amplification mechanism.
1.5.5 Firm Survival: Age Effects
Multiple studies have documented that young firms experience higher turnover rates than
older firms. In this section, I study the implications of the model for firm survival. Recall
that the outside option of the manager is sufficiently low that the initial continuation value
of the manager W0 is set to maximize shareholder value.
14 The first order condition for this
maximization is
F ′(W0;C) = 0. (1.5.2)
The optimal choice of W0 implies a tradeoff for the shareholders. On the one hand, a high
continuation value minimizes the costs of financial distress associated with liquidating the
firm or costly replacement of the manager. On the other hand, a high continuation value
implies greater payments to the manager in the future, which are costly to the shareholders.
Intuitively, this will imply that the shareholders will choose a value W0 ∈ [0, W¯ ). More
rigorously, combining the concavity of the value function, (1.5.2), and F ′(W¯ ) = −1 imply
that W0 < W¯ .
As discussed in the previous section, the manager’s continuation value drifts upwards
toward W¯ . This indicates that on average firms relax their financial constraints with the
14Other specifications are possible, in which I would need to specify the bargaining power of the share-
holders and the manager. My results do not vary qualitatively as long as the initial continuation value of
the manager W0 < W¯ .
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passage of time. Hence, as firms grow older they become less financially constrained, have
lower risk-shifting, and higher survival rates.
My mechanism bears resemblance to that in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). In
their model, leverage goes down over time as firms reduce their long-term debt, thereby
reducing the instances in which shareholders find it optimal to default. The key difference
between these two models is that in my model higher survival rates for more mature firms
results from lower risk-shifting, rather than from having reduced their debt obligations.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the interaction of the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and
bondholders with the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the manager. I
show the presence of managerial moral hazard induces shareholders to engage in higher
risk-shifting activities. I break down this result into two effects: the leverage effect and
the internal hedging effect. The leverage effect is standard, highly leveraged firms are
closer to default, thus they have greater incentives to increase risk-shifting. The internal
hedging effect is novel, the dynamic contract allows shareholders to compensate the manager
contingent on the profitability drawn. Thus, relaxing the incentive constrain of the manager
in the event that a high profitability is drawn. As a result, shareholders benefit more from
the upside, hence choosing higher risk-shifting.
Moreover, the internal hedging effect induces a non-monotonic relation between risk-
shifting and leverage. This non-monotonicty has the potential to reconcile seemingly con-
tradictory empirical evidence on the sign of this relation. Importantly, policies aimed at
regulating excessive risk-taking via capital requirements (effectively setting an upper bound
on leverage) are incomplete without looking at the structure of managerial compensation.
In particular, regulating contracts that reward managers for luck can be a good complement
to capital requirements.
An obvious shortcoming of the present work is the a priori structure of the debt contract.
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Endogenizing the form of the debt contract could produce further insights. Specifically, it
would be interesting to study the role of the maturity structure of debt, and of performance
sensitive debt in addressing the risk-shifting and moral hazard problems. It would also be
interesting to consider the case in which the manager is risk-averse. In this case, the moral
hazard problem will be compounded as it is costlier to expose the manager to risk. However,
this may dampen the risk-shifting problem. I leave these questions for future work.
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Appendices
1.7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Fix an arbitrary contract (P, τT ). Define
Wt = Et
[ˆ τT
t
e−γ(s−t)(µsλ(1− as)ds+ dPs)
]
,
as the manager’s utility when she follows action a under this contract.
Let
Mt = Et
[ˆ τT
0
e−γs(µsλ(1− as)ds+ dPs)
]
=
ˆ t
0
e−γs(µsλ(1− as)ds+ dPs) + e−γtWt,
which by construction is a martingale.
By the martingale representation theorem there exists measurable βt such that dMt =
βte
−γtdBt. But we also know that
dMt = e
−γt(µtλ(1− at)dt+ dPt)− γe−γtWt + eγtdWt,
Rearranging yields (1.4.2).
Moreover, since the manager is risk-neutral, if she shirks she receives λdt, but she loses
βtdt via a lower continuation value. Applying the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in the
Appendix in Sannikov (2008) completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: The contract after the shock is identical to the hidden effort
model of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006, Section III). I prove this proposition by a similar
procedure to the one in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006).
Proof of Proposition 3: If the shareholders induce the manager to shirk, her contin-
uation would evolve according to
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dWt = γWtdt− λµdt− dPt.
Optimality of implementing work between t ∈ [τS,τT ] implies that the expected gain for
shareholders from letting the manager shirk is lower than under the existing contract for
all W ∈ [0, W¯ ]:
rFˆ (W ) ≥ −(1− ψ)C + Fˆ ′(W )(γW − λµ).
Defining WS = λµγ gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 4: Applying the martingale representation theorem in a similar
manner to that in the proof of Proposition 1 shows (1.4.5). Moreover, incentive compatibility
is proven applying the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in the Appendix in Sannikov (2008).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5: I verify that the shareholder value function and policy given
are indeed optimal. Consider the case in which the manager cannot be replaced. It is not
difficult to add replacement, but complicates notation substantially. Let Γ = Γ(α, P, τT ) be
an arbitrary contract that implements high effort at all times, and define the shareholders
objective function J(W,Γ) as
J(W,Γ) = E
[ˆ min{τS ,τT }
0
e−rt(dYt − c(α)dt− (1− ψ)Ctdt− dPt) + 1{τS≤τT }e−rτS Fˆ (WτS )
]
.
Step 1. Define GΓt :
GΓt =
ˆ t
0
e−rs(dYs − c(αs)ds− (1− ψ)Csds− dPs) + e−rtF (Wt) ,
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where Wt follows (1.4.5). Applying Ito’s lemma and its generalization for point processes I
obtain
ertdGΓt =
{
µ0 − c(αt)− (1− ψ)Ct + F ′ (Wt)
(
γWt +
ˆ
R
αt∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ)
)
(1.7.1)
+
1
2
F ′′ (Wt)β2t + αt
(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (Wt + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W ))dU(µˆ)
)
− rF (Wt)
}
dt
+
{
F ′ (Wt)− 1
}
dPt +
{
σ + F ′(Wt)βt
}
dBt
+
{
Fˆ (Wt + ∆(Wt, µˆ), µˆ)dJt − αt
(ˆ
R
(F (Wt + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)dU(µˆ)
)
dt
}
.
The first term is less than or equal to zero by (1.4.4), the second term is less than or equal
to zero since F ′(W ) ≥ −1, and finally the last two terms are martingales and vanish in
expectations. Thus
GΓ0 = F (W0) ≥ E
[ˆ min{τS ,τT }
0
e−rt(dYt−c(α)dt−(1−ψ)Ctdt−dPt)+1{τS≤τT }e−rτS Fˆ (WτS )
]
.
Since Γ was arbitrary I conclude that F (W ) is an upper bound for the shareholder value
function.
Step 2. Since the inequalities inblack (1.7.1) hold with equality for the policies in
the proposition, I conclude that F (W ) is attained. Thus, F (W ) is the shareholders value
function.
Proof of Proposition 6: I prove this proposition by adapting Lemma 6 in DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006). Rewrite (1.4.8) as:
rF (W ) = µ− (1− ψ)C + F ′(W )γW + 1
2
F ′′(W )σ2λ2 +
1
2
θα(W )2, (1.7.2)
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where α(W ), ∆(W, µˆ), and β(W ) = λ represent the optimal policies from the maximization
problem given by (??) and (1.4.7) . Differentiating (1.7.2) with respect to θ yields
r
∂F (W )
∂θ
=
∂F ′(W )
∂θ
γW +
∂F ′′(W )
∂θ
σ2λ2
2
+ σα(W )
∂α(W )
∂θ
+
α(W )2
2
,
where
∂α(W )
∂θ
= −α(W )
θ
+
1
θ
[
−∂F (W )
∂θ
− ∂F
′(W )
∂θ
ˆ
∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ)
]
.
Hence
r
∂F (W )
∂θ
= −α(W )
2
2
+
∂F ′(W )
∂θ
(γW − ρt) + ∂F
′′(W )
∂θ
σ2λ2
2
+ α(W )
[
r
∂F (W )
∂θ
]
,
with boundary conditions:
∂F (W )
∂θ
=
∂F (Wreset)
∂θ
,
∂F ′(W¯ )
∂θ
= 0. (1.7.3)
Applying the Feynman-Kac formula it follows that
∂F (W ; θ)
∂θ
= E
[ˆ τS
t
−e−r(s−t)α
2
s
2
ds|Wt = W
]
≤ 0.
The boundary conditions in (1.7.3) have assumed that the manager is replaced when it’s
continuation value runs out. For the case in which termination equals default I would have
obtained
∂F (W ; θ)
∂θ
= E
[ˆ τT
t
−e−r(s−t)α
2
s
2
ds|Wt = W
]
≤ 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7: I proceed in a similar fashion as in the proof of Proposition
3. If the shareholders induce the manager to shirk, her continuation would evolve according
to
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dWt = γWtdt− λµdt− dPt + ∆(W, µˆ)dJt + ρtdt.
Optimality of implementing work between t ∈ [0, τS,) implies that the expected gain for the
shareholders from letting the manager shirk is lower than under the existing contract for
all W ∈ [0, W¯ ]:
rF (W ) ≥ max
α,∆(W,µˆ)
{
(1− ψ)C + F ′(W )(γW + ρt − λµ)
+α
(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W ))dU(µˆ))
)
− 1
2r
θα2
}
.
Using WS = λµγ and reorganizing the terms gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 8: Evaluating (1.3.2) at W = W¯ I obtain
α(W¯ ) =
1
θ
[(ˆ
R
(Fˆ (W¯ + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)− F (W¯ ))dU(µˆ)
)
−
ˆ
R
F ′(W¯ )∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ)
]
,
substituting back into (1.4.4) I solve for F (W¯ ), and plugging back in the above expression
I obtain
α(W¯ ) =
1
θ
[
−θr +
(
θ2r2 + 2θr(
ˆ
R
Fˆ (W¯ + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)dU(µˆ)
+
ˆ
∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ)− 2θ(µ0 − (1− ψ)C) + 2θγW¯ ))
)1/2]
.
Recalling that
αSB =
1
θ
[
−θr + 2
√
θ2r2 + 2θ(r
ˆ
R
Fˆ (µˆ)dU(µˆ)− (µ0 − (1− ψ)C))
]
,
and that Fˆ (W¯µˆ, µˆ) = µˆ/r − γW¯µˆ/r I notice that as λ −→ 0 then W¯µˆ −→ 0 and thus
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´
∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ) −→ 0. Moreover, when ´ ∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ) ≤ 0 then α(W¯ ;λ) ≥ αSB. Finally,
when the cost of replacing the manager is constant I can show that the value functions are
parallel shifts of each other for the cases in which the manager is replaced,15 and for the
cases in which the firm defaults the payout boundary is lower. Therefore, the condition
that
´
∆(W, µˆ)dU(µˆ) ≤ 0 will be satisfied.
1.8 Pricing Formulas
In this appendix I calculate the pricing formulas for debt in the cases with and without
moral hazard.
1.8.0.1 Debt price without moral hazard
The value of debt after the shock Dˆ(µ) is given by:
Dˆ(µ) =

C
r , (1− ψ)C ≤ µ
(1−φ)µ
r , (1− ψ)C > µ
The value of debt before the shock D(µ0) satisfies
rD(µ0) = C + α
[ˆ
R
Dˆ(µˆ)dU(µˆ)−D(µ0)
]
,
solving yields
D(µ0) =
C
r + α
+
α
´
R Dˆ(µˆ)dU(µˆ)
r + α
.
15See Hoffmann and Pfeil (2012)
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1.8.0.2 Debt price with moral hazard
The value of debt after the shock Dˆ(W ;µ) satisfies
rDˆ(W ;µ) = C + Dˆ′(W ;µ)γW +
Dˆ′′(W ;µ)σ2λ2
2
,
with boundary conditions
Dˆ(0) =
C
r
, Dˆ′(W¯ ) = 0,
when the manager is replaced. And with boundary conditions
Dˆ(0) =
(1− φ)µ
r
, Dˆ′(W¯ ) = 0,
when the firm defaults upon termination of the contract.
The value of debt before the shock D(W ;µ0) = D(W ) satisfies
rD(W ) = C +D′(W )(γW + ρt) +
1
2
D′′(W )σ2λ2
+α
(ˆ
R
(Dˆ(W + ∆(W, µˆ), µˆ)−D(W ))dU(µˆ)
)
,
with boundary conditions
D(0) = D(WReset), D
′(W¯ ) = 0,
when the manager is replaced. And with boundary conditions
D(0) =
(1− φ)µ0
r
, D′(W¯ ) = 0,
when the firm defaults upon termination of the contract.
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1.8.0.3 Debt price without internal hedging (NIH)
The price of debt after the shock Dˆ(W ;µ) is the same as in the previous section. The
price of debt before the shock when I shut down the internal hedging effect DNIH(W ;µ0) =
DNIH(W ) satisfies
rDNIH(W ) = C +D
′
NIH(W )γW +
1
2
D′′(W )σ2λ2
+α
(ˆ
R
(Dˆ(W, µˆ)−DNIH(W ))dU(µˆ)
)
,
with boundary conditions
DNIH(0) = DNIH(WReset), D
′
NIH(W¯ ) = 0,
when the manager is replaced, and with boundary conditions
DNIH(0) =
(1− φ)µ0
r
, D′NIH(W¯ ) = 0,
when the firm defaults upon termination of the contract.
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Chapter 2
Robust Contracts in Continuous Time (with Jianjun Miao)
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Abstract
We study a continuous-time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal
has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract
that maximizes his utility under the worst-case scenario subject to the agent’s incentive
and participation constraints. Robustness generates endogenous belief heterogeneity and
induces a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing so that the incentive constraint
does not always bind. We implement the optimal contract by cash reserves, debt, and
equity. In addition to receiving ordinary dividends when cash reserves reach a threshold,
outside equity holders also receive special dividends or inject cash in the cash reserves to
hedge against model uncertainty and smooth dividends. Ambiguity aversion raises both
the equity premium and the credit yield spread. The equity premium and the credit yield
spread are state dependent and high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.
JEL Classification: D86, G12, G32, J33
Keywords: robustness, ambiguity, moral hazard, principal-agent problem, capital structure,
equity premium, asset pricing
61
2.1 Introduction
Uncertainty and information play an important role in principal-agent problems. Consis-
tent with the rational expectations hypothesis, the traditional approach to these problems
typically assumes that both the principal and the agent share the same belief about the
uncertainty underlying an outcome, say output. The agent can take unobservable actions
to influence the output distribution. This distribution is common and known to both the
principal and the agent. This approach has generated important economic implications
and found increasingly widespread applications in practice, e.g., managerial compensation,
insurance contracts, and lending contracts, etc.
However, there are several good reasons for us to think about departures from the
traditional approach. First, the Ellsberg (1961) paradox and related experimental evidence
demonstrate that there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty (or ambiguity). Risk
refers to the situation where there is a known probability distribution over the state of the
world, while ambiguity refers to the situation where the information is too vague to be
adequately summarized by a single probability distribution. As a result, a decision maker
may have multiple priors in mind (Gilboa an Schmeidler (1989)). Second, as Anderson,
Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008) point out, economic
agents view economic models as an approximation to the true model. They believe that
economic data come from an unknown member of a set of unspecified models near the
approximating model. Concern about model misspecification induces a decision maker to
want robust decision rules that work over that set of nearby models.1
The goal of this paper is to study how to design robust contracts with hidden action
in a dynamic environment. We adopt a continuous-time framework to address this ques-
tion. More specifically, our model is based on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al
(2007). The continuous-time framework is analytically convenient for several reasons. First,
1There is a growing literature on the applications of robustness and ambiguity to finance and macroe-
conomics, e.g., Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein and Miao (2003), Hansen (2007), Hansen and Sargent
(2010), Ilut and Schneider (2011), and Ju and Miao (2012), among others.
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it allows us to represent belief distortions by perturbations of the drift of the Brownian mo-
tion using the powerful Girsanov Theorem.2 Second, it allows us to adapt and extend the
martingale approach to the dynamic contracting problems recently developed by DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006), Sannikov (2008), and Williams (2009, 2011). Third, it allows us to
express solutions in terms of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) which can be numeri-
cally solved tractably. Finally, it allows us to conduct capital structure implementation so
that we can analyze the impact of robustness on asset pricing transparently.
When formulating robust contracting problems, we face two important issues. The first
issue is that we have to consider who faces model ambiguity in our two-party contracting
problems, unlike in the representative agent models. As a starting point, it is natural to
assume that the agent knows the output distribution chosen by himself. Due to the lack of
information, the principal faces model uncertainty in the sense that he believes that there
may be multiple distributions surrounding the output distribution chosen by the agent.
The second issue is how to model decision making under ambiguity. There are several
approaches in decision theory. A popular approach is to adopt the maxmin expected utility
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Chen and Epstein (2002) formulate this approach
in a continuous-time framework. We find that this approach is hard to work with in our
contracting problems because two types of inequality constraints (the constraint on the set
of priors and the incentive constraint) are involved in optimization. We thus adopt the
approach proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2001), Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003),
and Hansen et al (2006).3 This approach is especially useful for our analysis since model
discrepancies are measured by entropy, which is widely used in statistics and econometrics
for model detection.
We assume that the principal copes with model uncertainty by designing a robust con-
tract that maximizes his utility in the worst-case scenario subject to the agent’s incentive
and participation constraints. The principal’s utility is modeled as the multiplier prefer-
2See Karatzas and Shreve (1991).
3See Hansen and Sargent (2008) for a textbook treatment of this approach in discrete time.
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ences proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2003)
and axiomatized by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006a,b) and Strzalecki (2011).
The principal solves a maxmin problem, which is related to the zero-sum differential game
literature (e.g., Fleming and Souganidis (1989)). Our key insight is that the principal’s
aversion to model uncertainty generates an endogenous belief distortion in that he pes-
simistically puts more weight on worse outcomes. Since the agent is assumed not to face
ambiguity, there is endogenous belief heterogeneity. This belief heterogeneity generates
a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing and has important implications for
contract dynamics and asset pricing.
We find the following main novel results. First, unlike DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
and Biais et al (2007), our robust contract implies that the optimal sensitivity of the agent’s
continuation value to the cash flow uncertainty is not always at the lower bound to ensure
incentive compatibility. The intuition is the following. The principal is ambiguous about
the probability distribution of the project cash flows. He wants to remove this ambiguity
and transfer uncertainty to the agent. But he does not want the agent to bear too much
uncertainty since this may generate excessive volatility and a high chance of liquidation.
When the agent’s continuation value is low, the principal is more concerned about liquida-
tion and hence the optimal sensitivity is at the lower bound so that the incentive constraint
just binds. But when the agent’s continuation value is high, the principal is more concerned
about model uncertainty and hence the optimal contract allows the agent to bear more
uncertainty. In this case the optimal sensitivity of the agent’s continuation value to the
cash flow is state dependent and exceeds its lower bound.
Second, we show that the robust contract can be implemented by cash reserves, debt,
and equity as in Biais et al (2007).4 Unlike their implementation, the equity payoffs consist
of regular dividends (paid only when the cash reserves reach a threshold level) and special
4See DeMarzo et al. (2012) for a related implementation. We can also implement the robust contracts
by credit lines, debt and equity as in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). We have not pursued this route in this
paper.
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dividends (or cash injections if negative). The special dividends or cash injections are used
as a hedge against model uncertainty. They ensure that cash reserves track the agent’s
continuation value so that the payout time and the liquidation time coincide with those in
the robust contract. Special dividends or cash injections occur only when the firm builds up
sufficiently high cash reserves. In this case, when the project performs well, outside equity
holders inject cash to raise cash reserves through new equity issues. But when the project
performs bad, outside equity holders receive special dividends so that total dividends are
smoothed. This result provides an explanation of dividend smoothing widely documented
in the corporate finance literature dated back to Lintner (1956).5 Our model prediction
is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Leary and Michaely (2011) that
dividend smoothing is most common among firms that are cash cows.
Following Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013), we can interpret positive special dividends
as share repurchases because our model does not have taxes or other features to distinguish
between these two. Then our model prediction is also consistent with the empirical evi-
dence that firms time the market by issuing equity when their market values are high and
repurchase equity when their market values are low, documented by Baker and Wurgler
(2002) and references cited therein. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013) explain this evidence
using a dynamic non-contracting model of firm investment and financing.
Third, incorporating model uncertainty has important asset pricing implications. The
principal’s worst-case belief generates a market price of model uncertainty, which contributes
to the uncertainty premium and hence the equity premium. The uncertainty premium lowers
the stock price and debt value and hence makes some profitable projects unfunded. It also
raises the credit yield spread. Importantly, the equity premium and the credit yield spread
increase with the degree of ambiguity aversion. They are state dependent and high for
distressed firms with low cash reserves. This also implies that the equity premium and
5Our result is related to the story in Fudenberg and Tirole (1995). In their model, the principal forms
expectations of future cash flows based on the agent’s income or dividend reports, but places more weight
on recent reports than older ones. To minimize the risk of being fired, the manager then has an incentive to
underreport good outcomes so that he can overreport if there is a future adverse shock.
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the credit yield spread are high in recessions since cash reserves are low in bad times.6
By contrast, there is no equity premium in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al
(2007).
Fama and French (1993, 1996) show that cross-sectional stock returns can be explained
by a three-factor model: the market return factor, the size factor and the book-to-market
factor. Fama and French (1995) show that book-to-market equity and slopes on the size
factor proxy for relative distress. Weak firms with persistently low earnings tend to have
high book-to-market equity and positive slopes on the size factor and hence high excess
stock returns. Although there are many empirical studies supporting the prediction that
distressed firms have high equity premiums, some researchers (e.g., Campbell, Hilscher,
and Szilagyi (2008)) find evidence that the equity premium is negatively related to default
probabilities. Friewald, Wagner and Zechner (2014) argue that a better empirical strategy
should link the credit and stock markets. They provide empirical evidence that firms’ equity
premiums increase with credit yield spreads estimated from CDS spreads, consistent with
our model prediction.
To generate time-varying equity premium or credit yield spread, the existing literature
typically introduces one of the following assumptions: time-varying risk aversion as in the
habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), time-varying economic uncer-
tainty combined with Epstein-Zin preferences as in the long-run risk model of Bansal and
Yaron (2004), or regime-switching consumption and learning under ambiguity as in Ju and
Miao (2012). By contrast, in our contracting model, investors are risk neutral with dis-
torted beliefs, dividends are endogenous, and the driving state process is identically and
independently distributed.
Although our model is too stylized to be confronted with the data, it can help ex-
plain the credit spread puzzle and the equity premium puzzle. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and
Goldstein (2009) study these two puzzles by comparing the Epstein-Zin preferences and
6Biais et al (2007) also show that the credit yield spread is high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.
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the Campbell-Cochrane habit formation preferences. Our paper based on robustness and
ambiguity aversion contributes to this literature.
Fourth, unlike DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al (2007), we show that
the stock price in the robust contracting problem is convex for low levels of cash reserves
and concave for high levels of cash reserves when investors (the principal) are sufficiently
ambiguity averse. Intuitively, the marginal value to equity consists of three components.
First, an increase in cash reserves away from the liquidation boundary generates a marginal
benefit that decreases with the level of cash reserves. Second, an increase in cash reserves
pushes them closer to the payout boundary. This raises the frequency of dividend payout,
but also depletes cash reserves. The associated marginal benefit decreases with the level
of cash reserves. Third, an increase in cash reserves away from the liquidation boundary
allows shareholders to have better ambiguity sharing. This marginal benefit increases for
low levels of cash reserves. This component is unique in our robust contracting problem
and may dominate the other two components for low levels of cash reserves so that equity
value is convex. Shareholders will benefit from a gamble involving the gain or loss from
an initial position of low cash reserves. This result implies that the asset substitution
or risk-shifting problem is more likely to occur for financially distressed firms or newly
established firms with low cash reserves (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). This prediction is
consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Eisdorfer (2008) that, unlike healthy
firms, financially distressed firms speed up investments as uncertainty increases to transfer
wealth from creditors to shareholders.
Finally, we establish a novel limited observational equivalence result. We show that our
robust contract and the optimal contract when the principal has time-additive expected
utility with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) deliver the same liquidation time and
payout policy to the agent when the robustness parameter is equal to the inverse of the
product of the CARA parameter and the discount rate. But the principal’s consumption
policy and value function are different in these two contracts and a private saving account
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is needed in the implementation for the optimal contract with a risk averse principal. This
result is different from the one that multiplier utility is equivalent to risk-sensitive utility
(Hansen et al (2006)) so that there is an alternative interpretation of robustness as enhancing
risk aversion. Although many models of ambiguity in decision theory admit some form of
observational equivalence to standard expected utility,7 we believe that the interpretation
based on ambiguity aversion and robustness helps us understand many empirical puzzles
in corporate finance and asset pricing. For example, from a quantitative point of view, an
implausibly high risk aversion parameter is often needed to explain a high equity premium.
But the high equity premium could be due to ambiguity aversion instead of high risk aversion
(Chen and Epstein (2002), Hansen and Sargent (2010), and Ju and Miao (2012)). In our
model, the principal is risk neutral, but his concerns about robustness generate an incentive
for him to share model uncertainty with the agent. Unlike risk sharing induced by risk
aversion, ambiguity sharing is caused essentially by the endogenous belief heterogeneity
between the principal and the agent (also see Epstein and Miao (2003)).
Our paper is related to a fast growing literature on dynamic contracting problems in
continuous time.8 Our paper is most closely related to the seminal contributions by DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al (2007). Our main contribution is to introduce robustness
into their models and study capital structure implementation and asset pricing implications.
Our paper is also related to the microeconomic literature that introduces robustness into
static mechanism design problems (see Bergemann and Schlag (2011) and Bergemann and
Morris (2012) and references cited therein). This literature typically focuses on static models
with hidden information instead of hidden action. Szydlowski (2012) introduces ambiguity
7For example, the celebrated multiple-priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is observationally
equivalent to an expected utility model with distorted beliefs.
8See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Schattler and Sung (1993), Ou-Yang (2003), Biais et al (2010),
Sannikov (2008), He (2009, 2011), Williams (2009, 2011), Zhang (2009), Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010), Prat
and Jovanovic (2010), DeMarzo et al. (2012), Cvitanic and Zhang (2012), Zhu (2012), He, Wei and Yu
(2012), and Szydlowski (2012). This literature is closely related to that on discrete-time dynamic contracts,
e.g., Green (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992),
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and DeMarzo and
Fishman (2007a,b).
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into a dynamic contracting problem in continuous time. He assumes that the principal
is ambiguous about the agent’s effort cost. His modeling of ambiguity is quite different
from ours and can be best understood as a behavioral approach. His utility model cannot
be subsumed under the decision-theoretic setting of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and its
continuous time version by Chen and Epstein (2002).
Our modeling of robust contracting problems is inspired by Hansen and Sargent (2012)
who classify four types of ambiguity in robust monetary policy problems in which a Ram-
sey planner faces private agents. They argue that “a coherent multi-agent setting with
ambiguity must impute possibly distinct sets of models to different agents, and also specify
each agent’s understanding of the sets of models of other agents.” This point is particularly
relevant for contracting problems because such problems must involve at least two par-
ties. Ambiguity aversion generates endogenous belief heterogeneity and delivers interesting
contract dynamics and asset pricing implications.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Sec-
tion 3 presents the solution to the robust contract. Sections 4 analyzes capital structure
implementation and asset pricing implications. Section 5 compares with a model with risk
aversion. Section 6 concludes. Technical details are relegated to appendices.
2.2 The Model
We first introduce the model setup which is based on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and
Biais et al (2007). We then introduce belief distortions and incorporate a concern for model
uncertainty.
2.2.1 Setup
Time is continuous in the interval [0,∞). Fix a filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 , P¯
)
,
on which a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion
(
B¯t
)
t≥0 is defined. Define a state
process as Yt = y+ σB¯t, where y > 0 and σ > 0. Here (Ft)t≥0 is the filtration generated by
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B¯ or equivalently by Y.
An agent (or entrepreneur) owns a technology (or project) that can generate a cumula-
tive cash-flow process represented by (Yt) .
9 The project needs initial capital K > 0 to be
started. The agent has no initial wealth and needs financing from outside investors (the
principal). Once the project is started, the agent affects the technology performance by
taking an action or effort level at ∈ [0, 1], which changes the distribution of cash flows.
Specifically, let
Bat = B¯t −
µ
σ
ˆ t
0
asds,
Mat = exp
(ˆ t
0
µas
σ
dB¯s − 1
2
ˆ t
0
(µas
σ
)2
ds
)
,
dP a
dP¯
|Ft = Mat ,
where µ > 0. Then by the Girsanov Theorem, Ba is a standard Brownian motion under
measure P a and we have
dYt = µatdt+ σdB
a
t . (2.2.1)
Note that the triple (Y,Ba, P a) is a weak solution to the preceding stochastic differential
equation.
The agent can derive private benefits λµ (1− at) dt from the action at, where λ ∈ (0, 1).
Due to linearity, this modeling is also equivalent to the binary effort setup where the agent
can either shirk, at = 0, or work, at = 1. Hence, we adopt this simple assumption through-
out the paper. Alternatively, we can interpret 1 − at as the fraction of cash flow that the
agent diverts for his private benefit, with λ equal to the agent’s net consumption per dollar
diverted. In either case, λ represents the severity of the agency problem. The choice of
the agent’s action is unobservable to the principal, creating the moral hazard issue. The
principal only observes past and current cash flows and his information set is represented
by the filtration (Ft)t≥0 generated by (Yt) .
9All processes in the paper are assumed to be progressively measurable with respect to {Ft} . Inequalities
in random variables or stochastic processes are understood to hold almost surely.
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Both the principal and the agent are risk neutral and discount the future cash flows
according to r and γ respectively. Assume that r < γ so that the agent is more impatient
than the principal. The technology can be liquidated. If it is liquidated, the principal
obtains L and the agent gets outside value zero.
The principal offers to contribute capital K in exchange for a contract (C, τ, a) that
specifies a termination (stopping) time τ, a cash compensation C = {Ct : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ} to the
agent, and a suggested effort choice a = {at ∈ {0, 1} : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ}. Assume that C and a are
adapted to (Ft) and that C is a right continuous with left limits, and increasing process
satisfying10
EP
a
[(ˆ t
0
e−γsdCs
)2]
<∞, t ≥ 0, C0 ≥ 0.
The monotonicity requirement reflects the fact that the agent has limited liability.
Fix a contract (C, τ, a) and assume that the agent follows the recommended choice of
effort. His continuation value Wt at date t is defined as
Wt = E
Pa
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−γ(s−t)(dCs + λµ(1− as)ds)
]
, (2.2.2)
where EP
a
t denotes the conditional expectation operator with respect to the measure P
a
given the information set Ft. His total expected utility at date 0 is equal to W0.
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al (2007) study the following contracting
problem in which the principal maximizes his expected utility without a concern for model
uncertainty.
Problem 2.2.1 (benchmark model)
max
(C,τ,a)
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−rs(dYs − dCs) + e−rτL
]
, (2.2.3)
10The sequare integrability is imposed to ensure Wt defined in (2.2.2) has a martingale representation (see
Cvitanic and Zhang (2013), Chapter 7).
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subject to:
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−γs(dCs + λµ(1− as)ds)
]
≥ EP aˆ
[ˆ τ
0
e−γs(dCs + λµ(1− aˆs)ds)
]
, (2.2.4)
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−γs(dCs + λµ(1− as)ds)
]
= W0, (2.2.5)
where aˆs ∈ {0, 1} and W0 ≥ 0 is given.
In this problem, consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis, both the princi-
pal and the agent use the measure P a to evaluate expected utility. Inequality (2.2.4) is
the incentive constraint and equation (2.2.5) is the promising-keeping or participation con-
straint.11 Assume that the agent and the principal cannot save and both the principal and
the agent have full commitment.
Let F b (W0) denote the principal’s value function for Problem 2.2.1. Then the project
can be funded if and only if maxw≥0 F b (w) ≥ K. If the agent has all bargaining power due
to competition of principals, he extracts the maximal W0 such that F
b (W0) = K. If the
principal has all bargaining power due to competition of agents, he delivers the agent W ∗
such that W ∗ solves maxw F b (w) .
2.2.2 Robustness and Belief Distortions
We now consider the possibility of belief distortions due to concerns about model misspecifi-
cations or model ambiguity. Both the principal and the agent view the probability measure
P a as an approximating model. Suppose that the principal does not trust this model and
considers alternative models as possible.
Suppose that all distorted beliefs are described by mutually absolutely continuous mea-
sures with respect to P a over any finite time intervals. Define a density generator associated
with an effort process a as a real-valued process (ht) satisfying
´ t
0 h
2
sds < ∞ for all t > 0
11It is technically more convenient to write the participation constraint as equality instead of inequality
“ ≥ 0” in (2.2.5).
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such that the process (zt) defined by
zt = exp
(ˆ t
0
hsdB
a
s −
1
2
ˆ t
0
h2sds
)
(2.2.6)
is a (P a,Ft)-martingale.12 Denote the set of density generators by Ha. By the Girsanov
Theorem, there is a measure Qh corresponding to h defined on (Ω,F) such that zt is the
Radon-Nikodym derivative ofQh with respect to P a when restricted to Ft, dQh/dP a|Ft = zt,
and the process
(
Bht
)
defined by
Bht = B
a
t −
ˆ t
0
hsds,
is a standard Brownian motion under the measure Qh. Under measure Qh, cash flows follow
dynamics
dYt = µatdt+ σ
(
dBht + htdt
)
. (2.2.7)
Following Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2002), Hansen et al (2006), and Hansen and
Sargent (2012), we use discounted relative entropy to measure the discrepancy between Qh
and P a,
rEP
a
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtzt ln ztdt
]
=
1
2
EP
a
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtzth2tdt
]
,
where the equality follows from (2.2.6) and integration by parts. To incorporate a concern
for robustness of belief distortions, we represent the principal’s preferences by multiplier
utility
inf
h
EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rt(dYt − dCt) + e−rτL
]
+
θ
2
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−rtzth2tdt
]
,
where the last term penalizes belief distortions. The parameter θ > 0 describes the degree of
concern for robustness. We may interpret 1/θ as an ambiguity aversion parameter. A small
θ implies a large degree of ambiguity aversion or a large degree of concern for robustness.
When θ approaches infinity, the preceding utility reduces to expected utility in (2.2.3).
12See Hansen et al (2006) for construction.
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2.3 Robust Contract
We formulate the robust contracting problem with agency as follows:
Problem 2.3.1 (robust contract with agency)
sup
(C,τ,a)
inf
h
EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rt(dYt − dCt) + e−rτL
]
+
θ
2
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−rtzth2tdt
]
, (2.3.1)
subject to (2.2.4), (2.2.5), and (2.2.6).
Mathematically, Problem 2.3.1 is a combined singular control and stopping problem
(see Fleming and Soner (1993)). As Hansen et al (2006) point out, it is also related to the
zero-sum stochastic differential game problem (e.g., Fleming and Souganidis (1989)). We
shall proceed heuristically to derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation
for optimality and then provide a formal verification theorem. We finally analyze several
numerical examples to illustrate economic intuition. It is technically challenging and quite
involved to provide a rigorous derivation of the HJBI equation. Such an analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper.
2.3.1 First-Best Robust Contract
Before analyzing the robust contract with agency, we start with the first-best case in which
the principal observes the agent’s effort choice and hence the incentive constraint (2.2.4) in
problem 2.3.1 is not valid. The derivations of the HJBI equation consist of several steps.
First, we ignore the incentive constraint (2.2.4) and keep the participation constraint. Using
Girsanov’s Theorem and the Martingale Representation Theorem, (Wt) in (2.2.2) satisfies
dWt = γWtdt− dCt − λµ (1− at) dt+ htφtdt+ φtdBht , (2.3.2)
where Bht is a standard Brownian motion under the measure Q
h.
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Second, we write the principal’s utility in (2.2.3) under the measure Qh as
EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rt(dYt − dCt) + e−rτL
]
+
θ
2
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−rtzth2tdt
]
= EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rt(µatdt+ σhtdt− dCt) + e−rτL
]
+
θ
2
EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rth2tdt
]
,
where we have used the fact that dYt = (µat + σht) dt+ σdB
h
t .
Third, define F (W0) as the value function for Problem 2.3.1 without the incentive
constraint (2.2.4) when we vary the promised value W0 to the agent. We use the dynamic
programming principle to write an approximate Bellman equation:
rF (Wt) dt = sup
dCt,φt,at∈{0,1}
inf
ht
µatdt+ σhtdt− dCt + θ
2
h2tdt+ E
Qh
t [dF (Wt)] , (2.3.3)
subject to (2.3.2). This equation has an intuitive economic interpretation. The left-hand
side represents the mean return required by the principal. The right-hand side represents
the total return expected by the principal. It consists of the cash flow plus the expected
capital gain or loss EQ
h
t [dF (Wt)] . The optimality requires the expected return equals the
required mean return. Note that all expected values are computed using the measure Qh.
Now we use Ito’s Lemma and (2.3.2) to derive
EQ
h
t [dF (Wt)] = F
′(Wt)(γWtdt− dCt − λµ (1− at) dt+ htφtdt) + F
′′(Wt)
2
φ2tdt.
Plugging this equation into (2.3.3) yields
rF (Wt) dt = sup
at∈{0,1},dCt,φt
inf
ht
µatdt+ σhtdt− dCt + θ
2
h2tdt
+F ′(Wt)(γWtdt− dCt − λµ (1− at) dt+ htφtdt) + F
′′(Wt)
2
φ2tdt.
Suppose that dCt = ctdt, where ct ≥ 0. Removing the time subscripts and cancelling dt, we
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obtain the HJBI equation
rF (W ) = sup
a∈{0,1},c≥0,φ
inf
h
µa+ σh− (1 + F ′ (W )) c (2.3.4)
+F ′(W )(γW + hφ− λµ (1− a)) + F
′′(W )
2
φ2 +
θh2
2
.
Clearly, for this problem to have a finite solution, we must have F ′ (W ) ≥ −1. We then
get c > 0 if and only if F ′ (W ) = −1. Define W¯ as the lowest level such that F ′ (W ) = −1.
This illustrates the feature of the singular control problem: the principal makes payments
to the agent if and only if Wt reaches the point W¯ . The payments make the process (Wt)
reflects at this point.
The objective function in (2.3.4) is convex in h. Solving for the worst-case density
generator yields
h = −φF
′ (W ) + σ
θ
. (2.3.5)
Substituting it back into (2.3.4) yields
rF (W ) = sup
a∈{0,1},φ
µa+ F ′(W ) (γW − λµ (1− a)) + φ
2
2
F ′′(W )− [φF
′ (W ) + σ]2
2θ
. (2.3.6)
Assuming that
θF ′′ (W )− F ′ (W )2 < 0, (2.3.7)
so that the expression on the right-hand side of equation (2.3.6) is concave in φ, we can
derive the optimal sensitivity
φ∗ (W ) =
F ′ (W )σ
θF ′′ (W )− F ′ (W )2 . (2.3.8)
Note that the concavity of F is sufficient but not necessary for (2.3.7) to hold. Since
λ ∈ (0, 1) and F ′ (W ) ≥ −1, it follows that λF ′ (W ) + 1 ≥ 0 and hence implementing high
effort at = 1 is optimal.
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The following result characterizes the first-best robust contract.
Proposition 1 Consider the first-best robust contracting problem. Suppose that
L <
µ
r
− σ
2
2rθ
, (2.3.9)
and that there is a unique twice continuously differentiable solution F to the ODE on [0, W¯ ],
rF (W ) = µ+ F ′(W )γW − [F
′ (W )σ]2
2θ
[
θF ′′ (W )− F ′ (W )2
] − σ2
2θ
, (2.3.10)
with the boundary conditions,
F (0) =
µ
r
− σ
2
2rθ
, (2.3.11)
F ′
(
W¯
)
= −1, F ′′ (W¯ ) = 0,
such that condition (2.3.7) holds and F ′ (W ) > −1 on [0, W¯ ). Then:
(i) When W ∈ [0, W¯ ] , the principal’s value function is given by F (W ), the first-best
sensitivity φ∗ (W ) is given by (2.3.8), the worst-case density generator is given by
h∗ (W ) = −φ
∗ (W )F ′ (W ) + σ
θ
, (2.3.12)
and the agent always exerts high effort a∗ (W ) = 1. The contract initially delivers W ∈[
0, W¯
] ≥ 0 to the agent whose continuation value (Wt) follows the dynamics
dWt = γWtdt− dC∗t + φ∗ (Wt) dB1t , W0 = W, (2.3.13)
for t ≥ 0, where the optimal payments are given by
C∗t =
ˆ t
0
1{Ws=W¯}dC∗s , (2.3.14)
and the project is never liquidated.
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(ii) When W > W¯, the principal’s value function is F (W ) = F
(
W¯
)− (W − W¯ ) . The
principal pays W − W¯ immediately to the agent and the contract continues with the agent’s
new initial value W¯ .
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. The principal is ambiguity averse and
would like to transfer uncertainty to the agent when designing a contract. Ideally, the risk-
neutral agent should insure the principal by making the principal’s payoff flows constant.
This means that the agent should absorb all risk from the project cash flows. However, this
contract is not feasible due to limited liability. The project cash flows can be negative and
the agent can incur losses. With limited liability, uncertainty sharing is limited. The net
marginal cost to the principal from delivering an additional unit of value to the agent is
1 + F ′ (W ) ≥ 0. The principal makes payments to the agent when and only when the net
marginal cost is equal to zero at some point W¯ . The tradeoff is the following: On the one
hand, the principal wants to make payments to the agent earlier because the agent is more
impatient. On the other hand, the principal wants to delay payments, allowing the agent’s
continuation value Wt to get larger. This benefits the principal because if Wt is closer to
zero, the principal has to bear more the project cash flows uncertainty. In particular, when
Wt = 0, the principal bears full uncertainty and his value is given by (2.3.11). The term
σ2/ (2rθ) represents the discount due to model uncertainty. It increases with volatility σ
and ambiguity aversion parameter 1/θ. Assumption (2.3.9) implies that liquidation is never
optimal in the first-best robust contract.
Proposition 1 shows that the worst-case density generator and the sensitivity of the
agent’s continuation value to the cash flow are state dependent. The agent bears large cash
flow uncertainty, but he does not absorb all uncertainty due to limited liability. Because the
principal also bears uncertainty, his value function F is nonlinear and the last two nonlinear
terms in the ODE reflect the value discount due to model ambiguity.
We emphasize that in two-party contracting problems, model ambiguity generates en-
dogenous belief heterogeneity. Specifically, the agent trusts the approximating model P a
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and his continuation value (Wt) follows the dynamics (2.3.13) under P
a. However, the
principal has doubt about the approximating model P a and the agent’s continuation value
under the principal’s worst-case model Qh
∗
follows the dynamics
dWt = γWtdt− dC∗t + φ∗ (Wt)h∗ (Wt) dt+ φ∗ (Wt) dBh
∗
t . (2.3.15)
This point has important pricing implications when we implement the robust contract with
agency later.
2.3.2 Robust Contract with Agency
Turn to the case with moral hazard in which the principal does not observe the agent’s
effort choice and hence the incentive constraint (2.2.4) must be imposed in Problem 2.3.1.
Without risk of confusion, we still use F (W0) to denote the value function for Problem
2.3.1 when we vary the promised value W0 to the agent. Suppose that implementing high
effort is optimal. Then DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) show that the incentive constraint is
equivalent to
φt ≥ σλ. (2.3.16)
Using a similar argument to that in the previous subsection, we can proceed heuristically
to derive the HJBI equation for optimality. Imposing constraint (2.3.16) and setting at = 1
in the associated equations in the previous subsection, we can show that the HJBI equation
is given by13
rF (W ) = sup
c≥0,φ≥σλ
inf
h
µ+ σh− (1 + F ′ (W )) c (2.3.17)
13If we adopt Chen and Epstein (2002) recursive multiple-priors utility model with the κ-ignorance spec-
ification of the set of priors, the HJBI equation is given by
rF (W ) = max
c≥0,φ≥σλ
min
|h|≤κ
µ+ σh− (1 + F ′ (W ))c
+F ′(W )(γW + hφ) +
F ′′(W )
2
φ2.
This problem is hard to analyze due to the two constrained optimization problems.
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+F ′(W )(γW + hφ) +
F ′′(W )
2
φ2 +
θh2
2
.
Thus the worst-case density generator is still given by (2.3.5) and there is a boundary point
W¯ such that c > 0 if F ′
(
W¯
)
= −1 and c = 0 if F ′ (W ) > −1 for W ∈ [0, W¯ ). We can then
rewrite the HJBI equation as
rF (W ) = sup
φ≥σλ
µ+ F ′(W )γW +
φ2
2
F ′′(W )− [φF
′ (W ) + σ]2
2θ
. (2.3.18)
Under condition (2.3.7), the optimal sensitivity is given by
φ∗ (W ) = max
{
F ′ (W )σ
θF ′′ (W )− F ′ (W )2 , σλ
}
. (2.3.19)
The last term in (2.3.18) reflects the cost of model uncertainty. When θ → ∞, that term
disappears and φ∗ (W ) → σλ. We then obtain the solution as in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006).
The following result characterizes the robust contract with agency.
Proposition 2 Consider the robust contracting problem with agency. Suppose that imple-
menting high effort is optimal and that condition (2.3.9) holds. Suppose that there exists
a unique twice continuously differentiable solution F to the ODE (2.3.18) on
[
0, W¯
]
with
boundary conditions
F ′
(
W¯
)
= −1, F ′′ (W¯ ) = 0, F (0) = L,
such that condition (2.3.7) holds and F ′ (W ) > −1 on [0, W¯ ). Then:
(i) When W ∈ [0, W¯ ] , F (W ) is the value function for Problem 2.3.1, the optimal
sensitivity φ∗ (W ) is given by (2.3.19), and the worst-case density generator is given by
(2.3.12). The contract delivers the value W ∈ [0, W¯ ] to the agent whose continuation value
(Wt) follows the dynamics (2.3.13) for t ∈ [0, τ ] , where the optimal payments are given by
(2.3.14). The contract terminates at time τ = inf {t ≥ 0 : Wt = 0} .
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(ii) When W > W¯, the principal’s value function is F (W ) = F
(
W¯
)− (W − W¯ ) . The
principal pays W − W¯ immediately to the agent and the contract continues with the agent’s
new initial value W¯ .
Unlike in the first-best case, the incentive constraint requires that the sensitivity φt be
at least as large as a lower bound σλ as in the DeMarzo-Sannikov model. In their model, the
choice of φt reflects the following tradeoff: a large φt is needed to provide incentives to the
agent. But a large φt also raises the volatility of the agent’s continuation value and hence
raises the chance of liquidation. The optimal sensitivity just achieves the lower bound σλ
when the principal’s value function is concave. However, this lower bound does not always
bind in the presence of model ambiguity. The reason is that there is an uncertainty and
incentive tradeoff. The robust contract should transfer uncertainty from the ambiguity
averse principal to the risk neutral agent as much as possible. Thus the agent should be
exposed more to the uncertainty so that the optimal sensitivity may exceed the lower bound.
Under what situation does this happen? For a low value of W, the principal is more
concerned about inefficient liquidation. Thus the optimal contract will set φt at the lower
bound. When W is large and close to the payout boundary W¯ , the principal is more
concerned about model uncertainty and hence he would like the agent to be exposed more
to the cash flow uncertainty by providing him more incentives so that
φ∗ (W ) =
F ′ (W )σ
θF ′′ (W )− F ′ (W )2 > σλ. (2.3.20)
From the analysis above, the agent is more likely to be overincentivized when his continu-
ation value is high.
Figure 1 plots the value functions for the robust contracting problem with and without
agency. The payout boundary is given by W¯FB for the first-best case. It is lower than
that for the contract with agency, implying that moral hazard generates inefficient delay in
payout. Both value functions are concave and become linear after the payout boundaries
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Figure 2.3.1: Value functions for the robust contracting problem. The upper curve
is the first-best value function and the payout boundary is W¯FB. The lower curve is the
value function with agency and the payout boundary is W¯ . The optimal sensitivity changes
value at Wˆ . Parameter values are µ = 10, r = 0.10, γ = 0.15, λ = 0.20, σ = 5, L = 90, and
θ = 20.
with a slope −1. Figure 2 plots the worst-case density generator h∗ and the optimal sen-
sitivity φ∗ for the contract with agency. Consistent with the previous intuition, the figure
shows that there is a cutoff value Wˆ , such that the sensitivity φ∗ (W ) reaches the lower
bound σλ for all W ∈ [0, Wˆ ] and it is given by (2.3.20) for all W ∈ [Wˆ , W¯ ].14 Figure 2
also shows that h∗ (W ) increases with W and h∗ (W ) < 0 for all W ∈ [0, W¯ ). Intuitively,
the principal’s aversion to model uncertainty leads to his pessimistic behavior. The local
mean of the Brownian motion is shifted downward under the principal’s worst-case belief.
At W = W¯ , the boundary conditions F ′
(
W¯
)
= −1 and F ′′ (W¯ ) = 0 imply that h∗ (W¯ ) = 0
and φ∗
(
W¯
)
= σ.
Figure 3 illustrates that the value function may not be globally concave. In particular,
it is convex when the agent’s continuation value is close to the liquidation boundary. To
14We are unable to prove this result formally. But it is quite robust for a wide range of parameter values
in the numerical solutions.
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robust contracting problem. Parameter values are µ = 10, r = 0.10, γ = 0.15, λ = 0.20,
σ = 5, L = 90, and θ = 20.
see why this can happen, we rewrite (2.3.18) as
φ∗ (W )2
2
F ′′(W ) =
[
rF (W )− µ− F ′(W )γW ]+ [φ∗ (W )F ′ (W ) + σ]2
2θ
.
When θ →∞, the second expression on the right-hand side of the above equation vanishes
and the model reduces to the DeMarzo-Sannikov model so that the first square bracket
expression is negative and F ′′ (W ) < 0. However, when the principal is sufficiently am-
biguity averse (i.e., 1/θ is sufficiently large), the second expression may dominate so that
F ′′ (W ) > 0. This case can happen when W is sufficiently small for the first square bracket
expression to be small. In this case, public randomization in the sense of stochastic ter-
mination of the project is optimal to the principal, as illustrated by the dashed line from
the origin in Figure 3.15 By contrast, when W is sufficiently large, F ′ (W ) is close to −1
and φ∗ (W ) is close to σ so that the second square bracket expression is close to zero. Thus
F ′′ (W ) < 0 when W is sufficiently large.
15Stochastic liquidation is common in the discrete-time models, e.g., Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006),
Biais et al. (2007), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a,b). Since such an analysis is standard, we omit it
here.
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γ = 0.15, λ = 0.20, σ = 5, L = 0, and θ = 6.
Intuitively, the marginal value to the principal F ′ (W ) for a small W consists of three
components. First, an increase in W pushes the agent’s continuation value away from the
liquidation boundary. This marginal benefit decreases with W . Second, an increase in W
pushes the continuation value closer to the payout boundary. This marginal cost increases
with W . Third, an increase in W pushes the continuation value closer to the cutoff Wˆ ,
allowing the principal to have better ambiguity sharing. This marginal benefit increases
with W when W is small. This component is unique in our robust contracting problem
and may dominate the other two components when W is sufficiently small. In this case
F ′ (W ) increases with W so that F is convex. But when W is sufficiently large, the first
two components dominate so that F is concave.
The following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing
high effort, which is satisfied in all our numerical examples.
Proposition 3 Implementing high effort is optimal at all times for Problem 2.3.1 if and
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only if
rF (W ) ≥ max
φ≤σλ
F ′(W ) (γW − λµ) + φ
2
2
F ′′(W )− [φF
′ (W ) + σ]2
2θ
, (2.3.21)
for W ∈ [0, W¯ ] , where F is given in Proposition 2 and satisfies condition (2.3.7).
When θ →∞, the condition in (2.3.21) reduces to the one in Proposition 8 in DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006).
The following proposition shows that the value function F decreases if the degree of
concern for robustness or the degree of ambiguity aversion increases, i.e., 1/θ increases.
The intuition is that model uncertainty is costly to the principal and hence reduces his
value. The last term in (2.3.18) gives this cost, which is the local entropy θh∗ (W )2 /2.
Proposition 4 The value function F (W ) on
[
0, W¯
]
in Problem 2.3.1 increases with the
parameter θ.
2.3.3 Bellman-Isaacs Condition
As explained by Hansen et al (2006), the Bellman-Isaacs condition is important for various
interpretations of robust control. They provide several examples (no binding inequality
constraints, separability, and convexity) to verify this condition. Their examples do not fit
in our model because the control problem in our model involves inequality constraints and
control of the diffusion or volatility term (φt). For our robust contracting problem, one can
check that if F is concave, then the max and min operators in (2.3.4) or (2.3.17) can be
exchanged (Fan (1953)) and hence the Bellman-Isaacs condition is satisfied. But condition
(2.3.7) in our verification theorem (Proposition 2) does not require global concavity of F
and our numerical examples show that F may be convex in some region for the robust
contracting problem. In this case, if one extremized φ first in (2.3.17), there would be no
solution (φ is infinity). By contrast, we extremize h first and φ next, the optimal solution
for φ in problem (2.3.18) is given by (2.3.19) as long as the second-order condition (2.3.7)
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holds. To conclude, whenever F is convex in some region, the Bellman-Issacs condition will
not hold in our model.
2.4 Implementation and Asset Pricing
2.4.1 Capital Structure
We use cash reserves, debt, and equity to implement the optimal contract characterized
in Proposition 2. We will show that ambiguity aversion generates some new insights into
asset pricing. As in Biais et al (2007), the firm has a bank account that holds cash reserves
Mt with interest rate r. The project payoffs are put in the account. Outside investors
(principal) hold debt with coupon payment [µ− (γ − r)Mt] dt and a fraction 1−λ of equity.
The entrepreneur (agent) holds a fraction λ of equity. Equity pays total regular dividends
dC∗t /λ. The cash reserves follow dynamics
dMt = rMtdt+ dYt − dC∗t︸︷︷︸
inside dividends
− dΨt, M0 = W0/λ, (2.4.1)
for Mt ∈
[
0, W¯ /λ
]
, where
dΨt = [µ− (γ − r)Mt] dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
coupon
+
1− λ
λ
dC∗t︸ ︷︷ ︸
outside dividends
+
[
σ − φ
∗ (Mt/λ)
λ
]
dB1t︸ ︷︷ ︸
special dividends
,
and W¯ , C∗ and φ∗ are given in Proposition 2.
Unlike the implementation in Biais et al (2007), there is a new term in the cash reserve
dynamics (2.4.1)
[σ − φ∗ (Mt/λ) /λ] dB1t = [σ − φ∗ (Wt) /λ] (dYt − µdt) /σ.
The interpretation of the other terms are the same as in the implementation of Biais et
al (2007). We interpret the new term as special dividends paid only to the outside equity
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holders. Note that this term can be negative and we interpret it as cash injection through
equity issues as in Leland (1994) style models.16 The expected value of special dividends is
equal to zero under the agent’s belief P 1.
We can rewrite the cash reserves dynamics as
dMt = γMtdt+
φ∗ (λMt)
λ
dB1t −
1
λ
dC∗t ,
and use (2.3.13) to show thatMt = Wt/λ. We can also check thatWt = E
P 1
t
[´ τ
t e
−γ(s−t)dC∗s
]
.
Thus the above capital structure is incentive compatible and implements the robust con-
tract.
By Proposition 2, when the agent’s continuation value Wt is small, φ
∗ (Wt) = σλ.
But when Wt is large, φ
∗ (Wt) > σλ. Thus special dividends occur only when cash reserves
Mt = Wt/λ are sufficiently large. In this case, when the project performs well (i.e., dB
1
t > 0),
outside equity holders inject cash in the firm in order to raise cash reserves.17 But when
the project performs bad (i.e., dB1t < 0), outside equity holders receive positive special
dividends. This payout policy is used to hedge against model uncertainty so that cash
reserves track the agent’s continuation value, i.e., Mt = Wt/λ. This ensures that the
liquidation time and the payout time coincide with those in the robust contract.
Following Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013), we can interpret positive special dividends
as equity repurchases. Because the firm’s market value is high (low) when dB1t > (<) 0, our
model predicts that the firm times the market by issuing equity when its market value is
high and repurchasing equity when its market value is low. This result is consistent with
the empirical evidence in Baker and Wurgler (2002) and references cited therein.
16In the model of DeMarzo et al. (2012), dividends can be negative and they provide the same interpre-
tation.
17In the Leland (1994) model, equity holders inject capital through new equity issues for the purpose of
avoiding costly bankruptcy.
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2.4.2 Asset Prices
We price securities using the principal’s pricing kernel which is based on his worst-case
belief Qh
∗
. Specifically, equity value per share is given by
St = E
Qh
∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
1
λ
dC∗s +
1
1− λ
ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
σ − φ
∗ (λMs)
λ
)
dB1s
]
,
where τ = inf {t ≥ 0 : Mt = 0} is the liquidation time. By a similar analysis in Anderson,
Hansen and Sargent (2003), we can show that the principal’s fear of model misspecification
generates a market price of model uncertainty. This market price of model uncertainty is
given by −h∗ (λMt) , where h∗ (λMt) is the worst-case density generator in (2.3.12).
Proposition 5 The local expected equity premium under the measure P 1 is given by
1
1− λ
[
σ − φ
∗ (λMt)
λ
] −h∗ (λMt)
S (Mt)
+
φ∗ (λMt)
λ
S′ (Mt)
S (Mt)
[−h∗ (λMt)] , (2.4.2)
for Mt ∈
[
0, W¯ /λ
]
, where h∗ and φ∗ are given in Proposition 2 and St = S (Mt) for a
function S given in Appendix B1.
The equity premium contains two components. The first component is due to the
exposure of special dividends to the Brownian motion uncertainty. This component is
negative because the factor loading [σ − φ∗ (λMt) /λ] / (1− λ) < 0 and special dividends
are intertemporal hedges. The second component is due to the exposure of the stock price
to the Brownian motion uncertainty. This component is positive whenever S′ (M) > 0.
Since the first component is zero for sufficiently small values of M, the equity premium
is positive for these values. In all our numerical examples below, we find that the hedge
component is small so that the equity premium is also positive for high values of M and
approaches zero when M = W¯/λ (since h∗
(
W¯
)
= 0).
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Debt value satisfies
Dt = E
Qh
∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t) [µ− (γ − r)Ms] ds+ e−r(τ−t)L
]
.
The credit yield spread ∆t is defined as
ˆ ∞
t
e−(r+∆t)(s−t)ds = EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ds
]
.
Solving yields ∆t = rTt/ (1− Tt) , where Tt = EQ
h∗
t
[
e−r(τ−t)
]
for all t ∈ [0, τ ] represents
the Arrow-Debreu price at time t of one unit claim paid at the time of default.
The following result is similar to Proposition 6 in Biais et al (2007).
Proposition 6 At any time t ≥ 0, the following holds:
Dt + (1− λ)St = F (Wt) +Mt − θ
2
EP
1
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)zsh∗ (Ws)2 ds
]
. (2.4.3)
The left-hand side of (2.4.3) is the market value of outside securities, i.e., the present
value of the cash flows these securities will distribute. The right-hand side of (2.4.3) rep-
resents the assets generating these cash flows. The last term is the entropy cost, which is
subtracted to obtain the operating cash flows allocated to the principal (outside investors),
EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(dYs − dC∗s ) + e−r(τ−t)L
]
.
2.4.3 Empirical Implications
In Appendix B1, we show that the stock price, equity premium, debt value, and credit yield
spreads are functions of the state variable, the level of cash reserves M. Figure 4 plots these
functions for three values of θ. The benchmark model corresponds to θ = ∞. The figure
shows that the stock price is an increasing function of M, while the equity premium and
the credit yield spread are decreasing functions of M. The principal’s aversion to model
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Figure 2.4.1: Stock prices, equity premiums, debt values, and credit yield spreads
for the robust contracting problem. The parameter values are µ = 10, r = 0.10,
γ = 0.15, λ = 0.20, σ = 5, and L = 0.
uncertainty generates a positive equity premium, which approaches infinity as M goes to
zero and decreases to zero as M rises to the payout boundary. This implies that the
equity premium is high for financially distressed or recently established firms with low cash
reserves. This also implies that the equity premium is high in recessions since cash reserves
are low in bad times. Intuitively, when M is low, the incentive constraint binds and the
ambiguity averse principal bears more uncertainty and hence demanding a higher equity
premium. But when M is large, the agent can share the principal’s uncertainty since the
optimal sensitivity φ∗t is state dependent. This leads the principal to bear less uncertainty,
thereby reducing the equity premium.
Our model predicts that the equity premium and the credit yield spread are positively
related: both are high for distressed firms with low cash reserves. This result is useful to
test the relation between cross-sectional excess stock returns and distress risk (Fama and
French (1993, 1995, 1996)). Our model prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence
documented by Friewald, Wagner and Zechner (2014) that firms’ equity premiums increase
with credit yield spreads estimated from CDS spreads.
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Figure 4 also shows that debt value decreases with the ambiguity aversion parameter
1/θ, while the equity premium and the credit yield spread increase with 1/θ. Thus our
model can generate both a high equity premium and a high credit yield spread in a uni-
fied framework by raising the ambiguity aversion parameter 1/θ. Though our model is too
stylized to be confronted with the data, it can help explain the credit spread puzzle and
the equity premium puzzle. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009) study these two
puzzles by comparing the Epstein-Zin preferences and the Campbell-Cochrane habit for-
mation preferences. Our paper contributes to this literature by introducing robustness and
ambiguity aversion.
Interestingly, unlike in the benchmark model, here the equity price may not be a concave
function of the cash reserves. This happens when 1/θ is sufficiently large. In this case the
stock price is convex for low levels of cash reserves and concave for high levels of cash
reserves. This result is related to the non-concavity of the principal’s value function.
To gain intuition, we rewrite the equity valuation equation (2.8.1) in Appendix B as
[φ∗ (λM)]2
2λ2
S′′ (M)
S (M)
= r − γM S
′ (M)
S (M)
+
−h∗ (λM)
(1− λ)S (M)
[
σ − φ
∗ (λMs)
λ
]
+
−h∗ (λM)φ∗ (λM)
λ
S′ (M)
S (M)
.
The expression on the second line is the expected equity premium. When θ →∞, φ∗ (λM)→
σλ and h∗ (λM) → 0 so that the expected equity premium goes to zero. Then the first
line above reduces to the ODE in Biais et al (2007). Proposition 7 of their paper shows
that equity value S (M) is concave. However, when investors are ambiguity averse with
a sufficiently small θ > 0, the equity premium is positive and large for a small M. This
positive value on the second line above can make S′′ (M) > 0 for a small M.
Intuitively, the marginal value to equity S′ (M) consists of three components. First, an
increase in M pushes cash reserves away from the liquidation boundary. The associated
marginal benefit decreases with M . Second, an increase in M pushes cash reserves closer
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Figure 2.4.2: Stock prices, equity premiums, belief distortions, and optimal sensi-
tivities for the robust contracting problem. The parameter values are θ = 50, µ = 10,
r = 0.10, γ = 0.15, σ = 5, and L = 0. Low values of M are not displayed for a better view
of graphs.
to the payout boundary. This raises the frequency of dividend payout, but also depletes
cash reserves. The associated marginal benefit decreases with the level of cash reserves M .
Third, an increase in M from a low level pushes cash reserves closer to Wˆ/λ, allowing equity
holders to have better ambiguity sharing. This marginal benefit increases with M when M
is small. This component is unique in our robust contracting problem and may dominate
the other two components when M is sufficiently small. In this case S′ (M) increases with
M so that S is convex. In addition, the equity premium decreases with M because investors
bear less ambiguity. But when M is sufficiently large, the first two components dominate
so that S is concave.
Finally, we examine the impact of the parameter λ, which describes the severity of the
agency problem. We focus on the implications for the stock market performance such as
stock prices and returns. Figure 5 shows that there is no monotonic relation between stock
prices and λ, but the expected equity premium decreases with λ. Intuitively, when λ is
higher, the agency problem is more severe. To incentivize the agent, the principal should
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pay the agent more frequently, resulting in a smaller payout boundary. A more frequent
dividend payout raises stock prices, but also depletes cash reserves and raises default risk,
thereby reducing stock prices. The net effect is ambiguous. This result is different from
that in Biais et al (2007) where stock prices decrease monotonically with λ. Figure 5 shows
that their result holds in our model when cash reserves are sufficiently high. But when cash
reserves are sufficiently low, the preceding positive effect dominates so that stock prices
increase with λ. For empirical work, one has to be cautious to interpret the parameter λ
since it describes both the exogenous severity of the agency problem and the endogenous
insider ownership. In an empirical study, Demestz and Villalonga (2001) show that there
is no systematic relation between ownership structure and stock prices once ownership
structure is treated as an endogenous variable.
Why does the expected equity premium decreases with λ? As Figure 5 shows, for
a higher λ, the agent is exposed more to the project cash flow uncertainty (i.e., φ (M)
is larger). Thus investors (the principal) are exposed less to uncertainty and hence the
expected equity premium and the market price of uncertainty (−h (M)) are lower. We can
interpret firms with a smaller λ as those with better corporate governance. Then our result
is consistent with the evidence, documented by Gompers, Isshi and Metrick (2003), that
firms with better corporate governance earn higher returns.
2.5 Comparison with Risk Aversion
Does risk aversion have the same implications as ambiguity aversion? To address this
question, we study a contracting problem with a risk averse principal who has no concern
for robustness. Suppose that the principal derives utility from a consumption process (Cpt )
according to time-additive expected utility
EP
a
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtu(Cpt )dt
]
,
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where we take u(cp) = − exp (−αcp) /α for tractability. Here α > 0 represents the CARA
parameter. Risk neutrality corresponds to α = 0. Since it is generally impossible to have
Cpt dt + dCt = dYt = µatdt + σdB
a
t , we suppose that the principal can borrow and save at
the interest rate r. Suppose that the agent cannot borrow or save. We use Xt to denote
the principal’s wealth level and write his budget constraint before liquidation as
dXt = rXtdt− Cpt dt− dCt + µatdt+ σdBat , X0 given, (2.5.1)
for 0 ≤ t < τ . At the liquidation time τ , the principal obtains liquidation value L and starts
with wealth Xτ− + L. The budget constraint after liquidation is given by
dXt = rXtdt− Cpt dt, Xτ = Xτ− + L, (2.5.2)
for t ≥ τ. The principal selects a contract (Cp, C, τ, a) to solve the following problem:
Problem 2.5.1 (contract with risk aversion)
max
(Cp,C,τ,a)
EP
a
[ˆ ∞
0
e−rtu(Cpt )dt
]
,
subject to (2.2.4), (2.2.5), (2.5.1), and (2.5.2).
This problem has not been studied in the literature and is of independent interest.18
The previous literature typically studies the case of a risk neutral principal and a risk
averse agent. In the benchmark model and the model in Section 2, the principal is not
allowed to save and consumes the residual profits dYt − dCt each time. Since the interest
rate and the principal’s discount rate are identical, the risk neutral principal is indifferent
between spending one dollar now and saving this dollar for consumption tomorrow. Thus
allowing saving does not affect the optimal contract except that wealth must be added
18Biais et al (2007, p. 371) point out that an important future research topic is to introduce a risk averse
principal and study the relation between expected stock returns and incentive problems.
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to the principal’s value function without saving to obtain the value function with saving.
When the principal is risk averse, the wealth level is a new state variable in addition to
the agent’s continuation value, making our analysis more complicated. We will show below
that due to the lack of wealth effect of the CARA utility, we can simplify our problem to a
one-dimensional one.
2.5.1 Optimal contract with Agency
Let V (W0, X0) denote the principal’s value function for Problem 2.5.1 when we vary W0
and X0. Suppose that implementing high effort at = 1 is optimal. Then V (W,X) satisfies
the heuristic HJB equation
rV (W,X) = max
Cp, c≥0, φ≥σλ
− 1
α
exp (−αCp) + VW (W,X)(γW − c)
+VX(W,X)(rX − Cp − c+ µ)
+VWW (W,X)
φ2
2
+ VXX(W,X)
σ2
2
+ VXW (W,X)σφ. (2.5.3)
The first-order conditions imply that
exp (−αCp) = VX(W,X),
VX(W,X) ≥ −VW (W,X) with equality when c > 0,
φ = max
{
−VXW (W,X)σ
VWW (W,X)
, σλ
}
.
The second-order condition for φ is VWW (W,X) < 0, i.e., V is concave in W.
Conjecture that the value function takes the form
V (W,X) = − 1
αr
exp (−αr [X +H (W )]) , (2.5.4)
where the function H can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent value to the princi-
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pal. Substituting this guess into the preceding first-order conditions yields the principal’s
consumption policy
Cp (W,X) = r (X +H (W )) , (2.5.5)
the optimal sensitivity
φ (W ) = max
{
αrσH ′(W )
H ′′(W )− αrH ′ (W )2 , σλ
}
, (2.5.6)
and the payout policy
H ′(W ) ≥ −1 with equality when c > 0. (2.5.7)
The second-order condition for φ becomes
H ′′ (W )− αrH ′ (W )2 < 0. (2.5.8)
Substituting (2.5.4), (2.5.5), (2.5.6), and (2.5.7) into (2.5.3) yields an ODE for H (W ) ,
rH(W ) = µ+H ′(W )γW +H ′′(W )
φ(W )2
2
− αr [φ(W )H
′ (W ) + σ]2
2
. (2.5.9)
We now find boundary conditions for this ODE. First, define a cutoff W¯ as the lowest
value such that
H ′
(
W¯
)
= −1. (2.5.10)
For W ∈ [0, W¯ ), H ′(W ) > −1. Then it is optimal to pay the agent according to dC =
max
{
W − W¯ , 0} . By the super-contact condition,
H ′′(W¯ ) = 0. (2.5.11)
Then equation (2.5.6) implies that φ(W¯ ) = σ > σλ.
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When W = 0, the project is liquidated and the principal obtains the liquidation value
L. Since both the discount rate of the principal and the interest rate equal r, we can show
that Cp(0, X) = r(X + L) and V (0, X) = − exp (−αr(X + L)) / (αr) so that
H (0) = L. (2.5.12)
Proposition 7 Consider the contracting problem 2.5.1 with risk aversion. Suppose that
implementing high effort at = 1 is optimal and
L <
µ
r
− ασ
2
2
. (2.5.13)
Suppose that there exists a twice continuously differentiable function H (W ) satisfying (2.5.9)
with the boundary conditions (2.5.10), (2.5.11), and (2.5.12) such that condition (2.5.8)
holds and H ′ (W ) > −1 on [0, W¯ ). Then the principal’s value function is given by (2.5.4)
for W ∈ [0, W¯ ], the principal’s optimal consumption policy is given by (2.5.5). The con-
tract delivers the initial value W ∈ [0, W¯ ] and the optimal payment C∗ given in (2.3.14) to
the agent whose continuation value (Wt) follows the dynamics
dWt = γWtdt− dC∗t + φ (Wt) dB1t , W0 = W, (2.5.14)
for t ∈ [0, τ ] , where the optimal sensitivity φ (W ) is given in (2.5.6). When W > W¯, the
principal’s value function is given by V (W,X) = − 1αr exp
(−αr [X +H (W¯ )− (W − W¯ )]) .
The principal pays W − W¯ immediately to the agent and the contract continues with the
agent’s new initial value W¯ .
Condition (2.5.13) is analogous to condition (2.3.9) and ensures that liquidation is in-
efficient in the optimal contract with risk aversion. We can give a necessary and sufficient
condition for the optimality of implementing high effort analogous to that in Proposition 3.
For simplicity, we omit this result.
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We first observe that when α = 0, ODE (2.5.9) reduces to that in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006). Furthermore, whenH is concave, (2.5.6) implies φ (W ) = σλ and hence the incentive
constraint always binds. Since the boundary conditions (2.5.10), (2.5.11), and (2.5.12) are
identical to those in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), the solution for H (W ) and W¯ must be
identical to theirs too. We next turn to the case of risk aversion with α > 0 and compare
the solution with that in the case of robustness.
2.5.2 Limited Observational Equivalence
When αr = 1/θ, equations (2.3.19) and (2.5.6) are identical and hence the two ODEs
(2.3.18) and (2.5.9) are identical. In addition, the boundary conditions are the same. The
second-order conditions (2.3.7) and (2.5.8) are also identical. By Propositions 2 and 7, we
have the following result:
Proposition 8 When αr = 1/θ, the robust contract for Problem 2.3.1 and the optimal
contract with risk aversion for Problem 2.5.1 deliver the same liquidation time and payout
policy to the agent. Furthermore, H (W ) = F (W ) , where F (W ) is the principal’s value
function in Problem 2.3.1.
Given this result, our previous characterization of the robust contract can be applied
here. But the interpretation is different. The tradeoff here is between risk sharing and
incentives for the risk averse principal. But the tradeoff in the robust contracting problem
is between ambiguity sharing and incentives. In that problem, the principal is risk neutral,
but ambiguity averse. The endogenous belief heterogeneity is the driving force for the
principal and the agent to share model uncertainty.
Note that Proposition 8 shows only a limited observational equivalence between the
robust contract and the contract with risk aversion because the principal’s consumption
policy and value function are different in these two contracts. In particular, the principal’s
value function V (W,X) is globally concave in W under assumption (2.5.8) in Proposition
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7, but the value function F (W ) in Proposition 2 may not be globally concave. Thus, unlike
in the robust contracting problem, public randomization is never optimal in the contracting
problem with risk aversion.
The preceding limited observational equivalence has a different nature than the equiv-
alence between robustness and a special class of recursive utility (i.e., risk-sensitive utility)
established by Hansen et al (2006). To see this, we consider a discrete-time approximation
for intuition. Let the time interval be dt. The time-additive expected utility process (Ut)
derived from a consumption process (ct) satisfies
Ut = u (ct) dt+ e
−rdtEt [Ut+dt] ,
where Et is the conditional expectation operator with respect to a reference measure P. The
function u characterizes both risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. The multiplier
utility process (Ut) with a concern for robustness introduced by Hansen and Sargent satisfies
the recursion
Ut = u (ct) dt+ e
−rdt
[
inf
Q
EQt [Ut+dt] + θEtΦ
(
ξQt+dt
ξQt
)]
,
where Φ (x) = x lnx − x + 1 is the relative entropy index and ξQt = dQ/dP |Ft . Solving
the minimization problem implies that the multiplier utility model is equivalent to the
risk-sensitive utility model given by
Ut = u (ct) dt− e−rdtθ lnEt exp
(−Ut+dt
θ
)
.
This utility is a special case of recursive utility studied by Epstein and Zin (1989). The
parameter 1/θ enhances risk aversion.
In the continuous-time limit as dt → 0, we can represent a utility process by the back-
ward stochastic differential equation
dUt = µ
U
t dt+ σ
U
t dBt,
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where (Bt) is a standard Brownian motion under P . For the multiplier utility model, the
drift µUt satisfies
rUt = u (ct) + µ
U
t + inf
ht
(
σUt ht +
θ
2
h2t
)
= u (ct) + µ
U
t −
(
σUt
)2
2θ
, (2.5.15)
where the worst-case density is given by ht = −σUt /θ. The expression on the right-hand
side of the last equality is the same as that for risk-sensitive utility, which is a special case
of the continuous-time model of recursive utility studied by Duffie and Epstein (1992).
We now consider two contracting problems in the “risk neutral” case with u (c) = c
by replacing the time-additive expected utility in Problem 2.5.1 with multiplier utility and
recursive risk-sensitive utility. Let V m (W,X) and V rs (W,X) denote the principal’s value
function in these two problems.
Proposition 9 The contracting problems 2.5.1 with multiplier utility and risk-sensitive
utility are equivalent. They deliver the same liquidation time and payout policy to the
agent as in the robust contract for Problem 2.3.1. In addition, V m (W,X) = V rs (W,X) =
X + F (W ) , where F (W ) is the principal’s value function in Problem 2.3.1.
2.5.3 Implementation and Asset Pricing with Risk Aversion
Proposition 8 shows that the robust contract and the optimal contract with risk aversion
deliver identical liquidation and payout policies when αr = 1/θ. This section will show that
the implementation of the two contracts and the asset pricing implications are slightly dif-
ferent. Now the risk averse principal (investors) can put his wealth into two bank accounts.
One is the corporate account which holds cash reserves Mt = Wt/λ and earns interests at
the rate r as in Section 4. Project payoffs are put in this account. The other is the private
account with savings Spt = Xt −Mt at the interest rate r. There are still debt and equity.
The firm pays coupon [µ− (γ − r)Mt] dt, regular dividends dC∗t /λ, and special dividends[
σ − 1λφ (λMt)
]
dB1t (it raises capital through equity issues when this term is negative).
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The entrepreneur (agent) holds a fraction λ of equity and receives regular dividends dC∗t .
Investors (principal) receive coupon, regular dividends (1− λ) dC∗t /λ, and all special div-
idends (or inject capital) and put them in the private saving account. Investors finance
their consumption spending using this account. The cash reserves Mt follow dynamics as
in equation (2.4.1). The firm is liquidated when the cash reserves reach zero and pays out
special dividends (repurchases equity) or raises capital through equity issues when the cash
reserves Mt rise to a level Wˆ/λ. It pays regular dividends when the cash reserves Mt hits
another higher level W¯/λ. As in Section 4, this capital structure is incentive compatible.
The private savings Spt follow the dynamics
dSpt = rS
p
t dt− Cp (λMt,Mt + Spt ) dt
+ [µ− (γ − r)Mt] dt+ 1− λ
λ
dC∗t +
[
σ − φ (λMt)
λ
]
dB1t ,
where Sp0 = X0 − W0/λ. The investors’ consumption Cp (λMt,Mt + Spt ) = Cp (Wt, Xt)
achieves their maximized utility in the optimal contract. From the preceding equation, we
can see clearly the smoothing role of special dividends. Note that σ − φ (λMt) /λ < 0. In
good times when dB1t > 0, investors inject cash into the firm’s cash reserves so that they
can receive dividends in bad times when dB1t < 0.
We now price debt and equity. The state price in the model with risk averse investors
is equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
pit = pi(t,Mt, S
p
t ) = exp (−rt− α [Cp(λMt, Spt +Mt)− Cp(λM0, Sp0 +M0)]) , (2.5.16)
where pi0 = 1. Using the state price, we can compute equity value per share as
St = E
P 1
t
[ˆ τ
t
pis
pit
1
λ
dC∗s
]
+
1
1− λE
P 1
t
[ˆ τ
t
pis
pit
(
σ − φ (λMs)
λ
)
dB1s
]
= EP
1
t
[ˆ τ
t
pis
pit
1
λ
dC∗s
]
.
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Unlike in the robust contracting problem, special dividends are not priced by the risk averse
principal. This is because the principal believes that the events of dB1s > 0 and dB
1
s < 0 are
equally likely. But the ambiguity averse principal is pessimistic and believes that dB1s < 0
is more likely and thus special dividends have a positive price.
We can also compute debt value
Dt = E
P 1
t
[ˆ τ
t
pis
pit
[µ− (γ − r)Ms] ds+ piτ
pit
L
]
,
and credit yield spread. Due to the lack of wealth effect for CARA utility, the cash reserve
level Mt is the only state variable for asset pricing. We still write St = S (Mt) and Dt =
D (Mt) . We will present asset pricing formulas in Appendix B2.
Proposition 10 For the model with risk aversion, the market price of risk is equal to
αr[H ′(λMt)φ(λMt) + σ], (2.5.17)
and the local expected equity premium under measure P 1 is
φ (λMt)
λ
S′ (Mt)
S (Mt)
αr[H ′(λMt)φ(λMt) + σ], (2.5.18)
for Mt ∈
[
0, W¯ /λ
]
.
When αr = 1/θ, Proposition 8 implies that the market price of risk in (2.5.17) is the
same as −h∗ (Wt) = −h∗ (λMt) , where h∗ is given in (2.3.12). The latter is the market
price of model uncertainty in the model with ambiguity aversion, which comes from the
endogenous distortion of beliefs reflected by the worst-case density generator h∗. Because
special dividends are not priced in the model with risk aversion, (3.6.22) is obtained from
(2.4.2) without the hedge component. Because the hedge component is generally small in
our numerical examples, we find that the equity premium in the model with risk aversion is
also high for distressed firms with low cash reserves and approaches zero when M approaches
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W¯/λ. In Appendix B2 we show that debt value and credit yield spread in the model with
risk aversion are the same as those in the model with ambiguity aversion when αr = 1/θ.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Contracting problems involve at least two parties. Introducing ambiguity or robustness into
such problems must consider which party faces ambiguity and what it is ambiguous about.
In this paper we have focused on the case where the principal does not trust the distribution
of the project cash flow chosen by the agent. But the agent trusts it. The principal is averse
to model ambiguity. This case is particularly interesting because it generates time-varying
equity premium and has interesting asset pricing implications. In particular, the equity
premium and the credit yield spread are high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.
In future research it would be interesting to consider other types of ambiguity. For
example, the agent may face ambiguity about the project cash flows or both the principal
and the agent may face ambiguity. Our paper focuses on contracting problems under moral
hazard with binary actions. It would be interesting to generalize our analysis to a more
general principal-agent problem such as that in Sannikov (2008). Finally, it would be
interesting to extend our approach to dynamic contracts with hidden information and study
robust mechanism design problems in continuous time.
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Appendices
2.7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Define Ha as the set of density generators associated with an
effort process a. Let Qh ∈ Pa be the measure induced by h ∈ Ha. Define Γ (w) as the set
of progressively measurable processes (φ,C, a) such that (i) φ satisfies
EQ
h
[ˆ t
0
(
e−γsφs
)2
ds
]
<∞ for all t > 0,
(ii) C is increasing, right continuous with left limits and satisfies
EQ
h
[(ˆ t
0
e−rsdCs
)2]
<∞ for all t > 0,
(iii) at ∈ {0, 1} , and (iv) (Wt) satisfies (2.3.2), with boundary conditions W0 = w and
Wt = 0 for t ≥ inf {t ≥ 0 : Wt ≤ 0} . For any (φ,C, a) ∈ Γ (w) and h ∈ Ha, define the
principal’s objective function as
J (φ,C, a, h;w)
= EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rt(dYt − dCt) + e−rτL
]
+
θ
2
EP
a
[ˆ τ
0
e−rtzth2tdt
]
= EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rt(µatdt+ htσdt− dCt) + e−rτL
]
+
θ
2
EQ
h
[ˆ τ
0
e−rth2tdt
]
, (2.7.1)
where we have used the fact that dYt = µatdt+htσdt+σdB
h
t and B
h
t is a standard Brownian
motion under the measure Qh. We can then write the first-best robust contracting problem
as
F (w) = sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
inf
h∈Ha
J (φ,C, a, h;w) , w ≥ 0. (2.7.2)
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Define an operator as
D(φ,a,h)F (W ) = µa+ σh+ F ′(W )(γW + hφ− λµ (1− a)) + F
′′(W )
2
φ2 +
θh2
2
. (2.7.3)
We can describe the optimality conditions stated in the proposition as variational inequal-
ities:
0 = min
{
rF (W )− sup
a∈{0,1},φ∈R
inf
h∈R
D(φ,a,h)F (W ) , F ′ (W ) + 1
}
, (2.7.4)
for all W ≥ 0 and the boundary conditions are given in the proposition. In particular, we
can check that under condition (2.3.7), the policies (φ∗, a∗, h∗) stated in the proposition
satisfy
rF (W ) = sup
a∈{0,1},φ∈R
inf
h∈R
D(φ,a,h)F (W ) = D(φ∗,a∗,h∗)F (W ) ,
for W ∈ [0, W¯ ] and F ′ (W ) = −1 for W ≥ W¯ . By (2.3.10) and the boundary conditions,
we can show that rF
(
W¯
)
= µ− γW¯ . Thus, for W ≥ W¯ ,
rF (W )−D(φ∗,a∗,h∗)F (W ) = rF (W¯ )− r (W − W¯ )− (µ− γW )
= µ− γW¯ − r (W − W¯ )− (µ− γW )
= (γ − r) (W − W¯ ) ≥ 0.
We now show that F is the value function in five steps. Step 1. Define the following
process:
G
(φ,C,a,h)
t =
ˆ t
0
e−rs (dYs − dCs) + θ
ˆ t
0
e−rs
h2s
2
ds+ e−rtF (Wt) , (2.7.5)
where (Wt) satisfies (2.3.2).
Step 2. Fix a process hφ = (hφt ) defined as
hφt ≡ −
φtF
′ (Wt) + σ
θ
.
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By (2.3.12), h∗t ≡ h∗ (Wt) = hφ
∗
t , where φ
∗
t ≡ φ∗ (Wt) . Consider any candidate choice
(φ,C, a) ∈ Γ (w). By Ito’s Lemma under Qh∗ ,
ertdG
(φ,C,a,hφ)
t = µatdt+ σh
φ
t dt+ σdB
hφ
t − dCct +
θ(hφt )
2
2
dt
+F ′ (Wt)
[
γWtdt− dCct − λµ (1− at) dt+ hφt φtdt+ φtdBh
φ
t
]
+
1
2
F ′′ (Wt)φ2tdt− rF (Wt) dt+ ∆F (Wt)−∆Ct
=
[
D
(
φt,at,h
φ
t
)
F (Wt)− rF (Wt)
]
dt− (1 + F ′ (Wt)) dCct
+
(
σ + φtF
′ (Wt)
)
dBh
φ
t + ∆F (Wt)−∆Ct,
where Cc is the continuous part of C, ∆Ct = Ct − Ct− is the jump, and ∆F (Wt) =
F (Wt)− F (Wt−) . By the variational inequalities (2.7.4) and dCct ≥ 0,
(
1 + F ′ (Wt)
)
dCct ≥ 0,
D
(
φt,at,h
φ
t
)
F (Wt)− rF (Wt) ≤ D
(
φ∗t ,a∗t ,h
φ∗
t
)
F (Wt)− rF (Wt) ≤ 0,
where a∗t ≡ a∗ (Wt) = 1 and the first inequality on the second line follows from condition
(2.3.7). Since F ′ (Ws) is bounded on
[
0, W¯
]
and F ′ (Ws) = −1 on [W¯ ,∞),
EQ
hφ
[ˆ t
0
e−rs
(
σ + φsF
′ (Ws)
)
dBh
φ
s
]
= 0.
Since F ′ (W ) ≥ −1 for W ≥ 0,
∆F (Wt)−∆Ct = F (Wt −∆Ct)− F (Wt)−∆Ct = −
ˆ Wt
Wt−∆Ct
[
F ′ (c) + 1
]
dc ≤ 0.
It follows that G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
t is a
(
Qh
φ
,Ft
)
-supermartingale. This implies that G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
0 ≥
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EQ
hφ
[
G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
t∧τ
]
for any finite time t ≥ 0. Taking limit as t→∞, we have
G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
0 ≥ EQ
hφ
[
G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
τ
]
≥ inf
h∈Ha
EQ
h
[
G(φ,C,a,h)τ
]
.
Taking supremum for (φ,C, a) ∈ Γ (w) and using (2.7.5), we obtain
F (w) = F (W0) = G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
0 ≥ sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
EQ
hφ
[
G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
τ
]
≥ sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
inf
h∈Ha
EQ
h
[
G(φ,C,a,h)τ
]
.
Step 3. Fix (φ∗, C∗, a∗) and consider any process (ht) ∈ Ha∗ . Use Ito’s Lemma to derive
ertdG
(φ∗,C∗,a∗,h)
t = µa
∗
tdt+ σhtdt+ σdB
h
t − dC∗ct +
θh2t
2
dt
+F ′ (Wt)
[
γWtdt− dC∗ct − λµ (1− a∗t ) dt+ htφ∗tdt+ φ∗tdBht
]
+
1
2
F ′′ (Wt)φ∗2t dt− rF (Wt) dt+ ∆F (Wt)−∆C∗t
=
[
D(φ∗t ,a∗t ,ht)F (Wt)− rF (Wt)
]
dt− (1 + F ′ (Wt)) dC∗ct
+
(
σ + φ∗tF
′ (Wt)
)
dBht + ∆F (Wt)−∆C∗t
≥
[
D(φ∗t ,a∗t ,h∗t )F (Wt)− rF (Wt)
]
dt− (1 + F ′ (Wt)) dC∗ct
+
(
σ + φ∗tF
′ (Wt)
)
dBht + ∆F (Wt)−∆C∗t .
Note that D(φ∗t ,a∗t ,h∗t )F (Wt)− rF (Wt) = 0. In addition, by (2.3.14),
ˆ t
0
e−rs
(
1 + F ′ (Ws)
)
dCc∗s =
ˆ t
0
e−rs
(
1 + F ′ (Ws)
)
1{Ws=W¯}dCc∗s = 0.
We also know that C∗ jumps only at t = 0 when w > W¯ so that
∆F (W0)−∆C∗0 = F
(
W¯
)− F (w)− (w − W¯ ) = 0.
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Thus G
(φ∗,C∗,a∗,h)
t is a
(
Qh,Ft
)
-submartingale. Hence G
(φ∗,C∗,a∗,h)
0 ≤ EQ
h
[
G
(φ∗,C∗,a∗,h)
t∧τ
]
for any finite time t. Taking limit as t→∞ yields
F (w) = G
(φ∗,C∗,a∗,h)
0 ≤ EQ
h
[
G(φ
∗,C∗,a∗,h)
τ
]
.
Taking infimum for h ∈ Ha∗ yields
F (w) ≤ inf
h∈Ha∗
EQ
h
[
G(φ
∗,C∗,a∗,h)
τ
]
≤ sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
inf
h∈Ha
EQ
h
[
G(φ,C,a,h)τ
]
.
Step 4. By Steps 2 and 3, we deduce that
F (w) = sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
EQ
hφ
[
G
(φ,C,a,hφ)
τ
]
= inf
h∈Ha∗
EQ
h
[
G(φ
∗,C∗,a∗,h)
τ
]
= sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
inf
h∈Ha
EQ
h
[
G(φ,C,a,h)τ
]
.
Since F (Wτ ) = L, it follows from (2.7.5) that
F (w) = sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
J
(
φ,C, a, hφ;w
)
= inf
h∈Ha∗
J (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h;w)
= sup
(φ,C,a)∈Γ(w)
inf
h∈Ha
J (φ,C, a, h;w) .
Step 5. Evaluating at the processes (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h∗) induced by the policies described
in Proposition 1, we show that
F (w) = J (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h∗;w) .
Consider first w ∈ [0, W¯ ] . In this case C∗ has no jump. As in Step 2, we can easily
check that G
(φ∗,C∗,a∗,h∗)
t is a
(
Qh
∗
,Ft
)
-martingale. Thus
F (w) = EQ
h
[
G(φ
∗,C∗,a∗,h∗)
τ
]
= J (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h∗;w) .
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Consider next w > W¯ . In this case C∗0 = w − W¯ and the agent’s initial continuation value
jumps to W¯ . By definition of J and the previous case, we can derive
J (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h∗;w) = − (w − W¯ )+ J (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h∗; W¯ ) = − (w − W¯ )+ F (W¯ ) = F (w) .
We conclude that (φ∗, C∗, a∗, h∗) is optimal for the first-best robust contracting problem.
The boundary condition (2.3.11) follows from the fact that the principal can deliver W = 0
to the agent who always exerts high effort and never gets paid. In this case W = 0 is an
absorbing state and the principal obtains the value µ/r − σ2/ (2rθ) . If condition (2.3.9)
holds, the project is never liquidated, i.e., τ =∞. Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3: Define J as in (2.7.1). We modify condition (iii) in
the definition of the feasible set Γ (w) to incorporate the incentive constraint as follows: if
at = 0, then φt ≤ σλ and if at = 1, then φt ≥ σλ. The optimality condition described in
Propositions 2 and 3 can be summarized by the following variational inequalities:
0 = min
{
rF (W )− sup
(a,φ)∈Λ
inf
h∈R
D(φ,a,h)F (W ) , F ′ (W ) + 1
}
, (2.7.6)
for all W ≥ 0, where
Λ = {(0, ϕ) : ϕ ≤ σλ} ∪ {(1, ϕ) : ϕ ≥ σλ} .
The boundary conditions are given in Proposition 2. It is easy to verify that under conditions
(2.3.7) and (2.3.21), a∗ (W ) = 1, φ∗ (W ) , and h∗ (W ) described in Proposition 2 achieves
the preceding maxmin. Unlike in the first-best contract, delivering the agent W = 0 who
always exerts high effort is not incentive compatible. Thus the principal will liquidate the
project at W = 0 so that F (0) = L. The rest of the proof is the same as that for Proposition
1. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: We adapt Lemma 6 in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). We use
the Envelope Theorem to differentiate ODE (2.3.18) with respect to θ to obtain
r
∂F (W )
∂θ
=
∂F ′(W )
∂θ
γW +
φ∗ (W )2
2
∂F ′′(W )
∂θ
+
[φ∗ (W )F ′ (W ) + σ]2
2θ2
− [φ
∗ (W )F ′ (W ) + σ]φ∗ (W )
θ
∂F ′(W )
∂θ
.
Under measure Qh
∗
, it follows from (2.3.12) and (2.3.13) that (Wt) satisfies
dWt = γWtdt− dC∗t −
[φ∗ (Wt)F ′ (Wt) + σ]φ∗ (Wt)
θ
dt+ φ∗ (Wt) dBh
∗
t ,
where
(
Bh
∗
t
)
is a standard Brownian motion under Qh
∗
. Using the Feynman-Kac formula,
we obtain that the solution to the above ODE for ∂F (W )/∂θ is
∂F (W )
∂θ
= EQ
h∗
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
[φ∗ (Ws)F ′ (Ws) + σ]2
2θ2
ds|Wt = W
]
≥ 0,
as desired. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: The equity premium is defined as
1
St
dC∗tλ + 11− λ
[
σ − φ
∗ (Wt)
λ
]
dB1t︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividends
+ dSt︸︷︷︸
capital gains
− rStdt
 . (2.7.7)
By Ito’s Lemma,
dSt = dS (Mt) = S
′ (Mt) γMtdt+ S′ (Mt)
φ∗ (λMt)
λ
dB1t (2.7.8)
−S
′ (Mt)
λ
dC∗t +
[φ∗ (λMt)]2
2λ2
S′′ (Mt) dt.
Plugging (2.7.8) and (2.8.1) into (2.7.7) and noting the fact that Ct increases only when
S′ (Mt) = 1, we can compute the local expected equity premium under measure P 1 given
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in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: It follows from (2.3.13) and Girsanov’s Theorem that
dWt = γWtdt− dC∗t + φ∗ (Wt)h∗ (Wt) dt+ φ∗ (Wt) dBh
∗
t .
By Ito’s Lemma,
e−rT∧τWT∧τ = e−rtWt +
ˆ T∧τ
t
e−rs (γ − r)Wsds+
ˆ T∧τ
t
e−rsφ∗ (Ws) dBh
∗
s
−
ˆ T∧τ
t
e−rsdC∗s +
ˆ T∧τ
t
e−rsφ∗ (Ws)h∗ (Ws) ds,
for any T > t, where τ = inf {t ≥ 0 : Wt = 0} . Taking expectations with respect to Qh∗ and
letting T →∞, we use Mt = Wt/λ and Wτ = 0 to derive
Mt = E
Qh
∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
1
λ
dC∗s − (γ − r)Msds−
φ∗ (Ws)h∗ (Ws)
λ
ds
)]
.
It follows that
Dt + (1− λ)St
= EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t) (µ− (γ − r)Ms) ds+ e−r(τ−t)L
]
+EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
1− λ
λ
dC∗s
]
+ EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
σ − φ
∗ (Ws)
λ
)
dB1s
]
= EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t) (dYs − dC∗s ) + e−r(τ−t)L
]
+EQ
h∗
t
[ˆ τ
t
e−r(s−t)
(
1
λ
dC∗s − (γ − r)Msds−
φ∗ (Ws)h∗ (Ws)
λ
ds
)]
,
where we have used the fact that dYt = µdt+σh
∗ (Wt) +σdBh
∗
t . The expression on the last
last line is Mt. We then obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 7: Given the conjecture in (2.5.4), we can derive
VX(W,X) = e
−αr(X+H(W )), VXX(W,X) = −αre−αr(X+H(W )),
VW (W,X) = H
′ (W ) e−αr(X+H(W )), VXW (W,X) = −αrH ′ (W ) e−αr(X+H(W )),
VWW (W,X) =
[
H ′′ (W )− αrH ′ (W )2
]
e−αr(X+H(W )).
Substituting these expressions into the HJB equation (2.5.3), we can derive the optimal
policies in the proposition. The proof of the optimality follows a similar argument for
Propositions 1-3. We omit it here. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: The result follows from Propositions 2 and 7. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: By equation (2.5.15), the HJB equation for multiplier utility
is given by
rV m(W,X) = max
Cp, c≥0, φ≥σλ
Cp + V mW (W,X)(γW − c)
+V mX (W,X)(rX − Cp − c+ µ)
+V mWW (W,X)
φ2
2
+ V mXX(W,X)
σ2
2
+ V mXW (W,X)σφ
+ min
h
[V mX (W,X)σ + V
m
W (W,X)φ]h+
θ
2
h2.
The optimal density generator is given by
h = −V
m
X (W,X)σ + V
m
W (W,X)φ
θ
.
This HJB equation is equivalent to that for risk-sensitive utility after solving for the optimal
density. We can easily verify that V m (W,X) = V rs (W,X) = X + F (W ) , where F (W ) is
the value function for Problem 2.3.1. The optimal solutions are also the same. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: See Appendix B2. Q.E.D.
112
2.8 Asset Pricing Formulas
In this appendix we follow DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al (2007) to represent
asset prices as ODEs.
2.8.1 Robust Contract
We use the cash reserves M as a state variable and write debt value, equity price and
credit yield spreads as functions of M . Under the worst-case belief Qh
∗
, we use Girsanov’s
Theorem to write the cash reserve dynamics as
dMt = γMtdt+
φ∗ (λMt)h∗ (λMt)
λ
dt+
φ∗ (λMt)
λ
dBh
∗
t −
1
λ
dC∗t ,
where φ∗, h∗, and C∗ are given by (2.3.19), (2.3.12), and (2.3.14), respectively. Thus the
equity price St = S (Mt) satisfies the ODE
rS (M) =
1
1− λ
[
σ − φ
∗ (λMs)
λ
]
h∗ (λM) (2.8.1)
+
(
γM +
φ∗ (λM)h∗ (λM)
λ
)
S′ (M) +
[φ∗ (λM)]2
2λ2
S′′ (M) ,
with the boundary conditions S (0) = 0 and S′
(
W¯/λ
)
= 1.
The bond price Dt = D (Mt) satisfies the ODE
rD (M) = µ− (γ − r)M +
(
γM +
φ∗ (λM)h∗ (λM)
λ
)
D′ (M) +
[φ∗ (λM)]2
2λ2
D′′ (M) ,
with boundary conditions D (0) = L and D′
(
W¯/λ
)
= 0. The Arrow-Debreu price of one
unit claim paid at the time of default, Tt = T (Mt) , satisfies the ODE
rT (M) =
(
γM +
φ∗ (λM)h∗ (λM)
λ
)
T ′ (M) +
[φ∗ (λM)]2
2λ2
T ′′ (M) ,
subject to the boundary conditions T (0) = 1 and T ′
(
W¯/λ
)
= 0.
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2.8.2 Contract with Risk Aversion
Applying Ito’s Lemma to (2.5.16) yields
dpit = dpi(t,Mt, S
p
t ) = pi1(t,Mt, S
p
t )dt+ pi2(t,Mt, S
p
t )dMt + pi3(t,Mt, S
p
t )dS
p
t
+
1
2
pi22(t,Mt, S
p
t )d [M,M ]t +
1
2
pi33(t,Mt, S
p
t )d [S
p, Sp]t + pi23(t,Mt, S
p
t )d [M,S
p]t ,
where the subscript of pi denotes partial derivative and [X,Y ]t denotes the quadratic co-
variance between any two processes (Xt) and (Yt) . Plugging the dynamics of Mt and S
p
t
and using equation (2.5.9), we can show that
−dpit
pit
= rdt+ αr[H ′(λMt)φ(λMt) + σ]dB1t ,
where φ is given by (2.5.6). Thus the market price of risk is given by (2.5.17). Proposition
7 shows that C∗t makes Wt reflect at a constant boundary W¯ . This payout policy does not
depend on wealth X. It follows that equity value only depends on one state variable Mt.
Let St = S (Mt) . Since the process (mt) defined below is a martingale,
mt ≡ pitSt +
ˆ t
0
pis
1
λ
dC∗s = Et
[ˆ τ
0
pis
1
λ
dC∗s
]
,
we use Ito’s Lemma and set its drift to zero. We then obtain the ODE
rS(M) = S′(M)
[
γM − αr(H ′(λM)φ(λM) + σ)φ(λM)
λ
]
+ S′′(M)
φ(λM)2
2λ2
, (2.8.2)
with boundary conditions S(0) = 0 and S′(W¯/λ) = 1.
The local expected equity premium is given by
EP
1
t
[
dSt
St
+
dC∗t
λSt
− rdt
]
.
We use (2.8.2) and Ito’s Lemma to compute dSt = dS (Mt) and obtain (3.6.22).
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Similarly, we can compute that debt value depends on Mt only. We write debt value as
Dt = D (Mt) and derive its ODE
rD(M) = µ− (γ − r)M +D′′(M)φ(λM)
2
2λ2
+D′(M)
[
γM − αr(H ′(λM)φ(λM) + σ)φ(λM)
λ
]
,
with boundary conditions D(0) = L and D′(W¯/λ) = 0. The price of Arrow-Debreu security
that pays one unit at default is given by Tt = Et
[
piτ
pit
]
. Then Tt = T (Mt) satisfies the ODE
rT (M) = T ′(M)
[
γM − αr(H ′(λM)φ(λM) + σ)φ(λM)
λ
]
+ T ′′(M)
φ(λM)2
2λ2
,
with boundary conditions T (0) = 1 and T ′(W¯/λ) = 0. The credit yield spread ∆t satisfies
ˆ ∞
t
e−(r+∆t)(s−t)ds = EP
1
t
[ˆ τ
t
pis
pit
ds
]
. (2.8.3)
We can easily compute that
∆t =
rTt
1− Tt .
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Chapter 3
Accounting Frictions: Implications for the Business Cycle
122
Abstract
Credit constraints have been shown to be a powerful mechanism by which small shocks to
productivity are amplified and propagated through the economy. This paper explores the
consequences of incorporating accounting frictions into the traditional models that generate
business cycles through credit constraints. Borrowers and lenders don’t mark their assets to
market on a regular basis, instead they are often reluctant to write down the value of their
assets after the market price goes down. The interaction of this accounting friction with
the credit constraints has important implications for the amplification and propagation of
shocks, as well as for the cyclicality induced in the economy.
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3.1 Introduction
Fluctuations in aggregate output have been labeled by economists as the business cycle.
These fluctuations appear to be large, persistent, asymmetric, and cyclical. One possible
explanation for the business cycle is that external shocks have these properties, and aggre-
gate output simply inherits them. However, it is hard to find evidence for the existence
of such shocks in the data. While earthquakes, technological inventions, oil shocks, and
government policies may have sizable, sometimes persistent effects on output, by and large
this analogy does not hold for the business cycle. A more plausible explanation is that
shocks are smaller, not so persistent, and not necessarily cyclical, but that the structure of
the economy endogenously reacts to these shocks, producing larger, more persistent cyclical
fluctuations in output.
Credit constraints have emerged as a plausible transmission mechanism through which
external shocks generate business cycles. Generally, this mechanism is thought to work
in the following way: some agents in the economy are credit constrained, and they can
only have access to credit markets through collateralized loans. The rationale for this
explanation is that lenders don’t have the legal or technological capability to enforce their
lending. Borrowers are aware of this constraint faced by lenders, and may ask for an ex-
post renegotiation of their loans, repudiating their initial contractual obligations. Lenders
in turn foresee this outcome find it optimal only to lend amounts up to the value of the
collateral that can be seized if the borrower fails to pay his debt. Therefore, an initial
shock to the economy reduces demand for capital, lowering its price. The reduction in price
tightens the borrowing constraint of the borrower, who is only able to borrow a smaller
amount than prior to the shock. The tightening in turn reduces further the demand for
capital, feeding into this loop.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) formalize this intuition in the context of a two agent general
equilibrium model, in which one of the agents is credit constrained. The wealth distribution
plays a key role in this model, as capital flows from the borrower to the lender once a bad
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shock hits the economy. Borrowers are assumed to be more productive than lenders, and
thus the shock produces a misallocation of resources, which decreases aggregate output.
Kiyotaki (1998) incorporates a slight variation of this initial model, in which borrowers and
lenders exchange roles in a stochastic manner through the life of the economy. Kocherlakota
(2000) recreates this intuition in a simple one-agent partial equilibrium economy, in which
the agent can borrow from outside, but only the agent plays a role in determining prices.
The afore mentioned models describe a deterministic economy in which the agents have
perfect foresight into the future. The shocks are zero probability events that the agents did
not foresee. These shortcomings have been addressed more recently by Brunnermier and
Sannikov (2011), and by He and Krishnamurthy(2008), who develop models in which the
economy is driven by a sequence of shocks over which the agents have fully rational expecta-
tions. Moreover, these authors enhance tractability by modeling the dynamics in continuous
time, and obtain closed form solutions that characterize the volatility of aggregate output
as a function of the volatility of the exogenous shocks.
In all of the work above balance sheets are assumed to be constantly marked to market.
In other words, there is never any discrepancy between the price at which an asset can be sold
in the market, and the price at which it sits in the agent’s balance sheet. In reality financial
institutions are subject to various forms of regulation regarding their accounting practices.
Moreover, write-downs are typically very painful for firms that are highly leveraged as they
wipe out a very large share of equity, or bring about insolvency. This paper examines the
effects of accounting frictions resulting from failure to mark to market instantaneously on
business cycle dynamics.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes Kocherlakota’s
model, and elaborates on the consequences of assuming an endogenous borrowing constraint
versus an exogenous borrowing constraint. Section 3 generalizes Kocherlakota’s model by
introducing an accounting friction in the balance sheet of the farmer. The implications for
persistence and amplification of shocks are characterized analytically. Section 4 provides
125
numerical simulations for the generalized model and explores the parameter space. Section
5 concludes.
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3.2 Kocherlakota’s Model
In this section we illustrate the model described by Kocherlakota (2000). Technically,
this model is a small open economy version of a neoclassical growth problem with full
depreciation. In this model we have a group of farmers that can consume their output, or
invest it as seed for the production of more output next period. The production function
is given by
Yt = F (Xt, Lt) = X
α1
t L
α2
t s.t. α1 + α2 < 1 (3.2.1)
where Xt is the amount of seed planted last period, and Lt is the amount of land used
in the production.
An agent can split his output between current consumption Ct and seed for next period
Xt+1.
Yt = Ct +Xt+1 (3.2.2)
The farmers all have identical preferences over consumption streams given by:
U({Ct}t=∞t=1 ) =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 ln(Ct) (3.2.3)
where β captures the farmer’s discount rate. Each farmer begins the initial time period
with one unit of land and an amount of seed equal to Xt. Moreover, the farmer can borrow
or lend from the rest of the world at an interest rate R such that (1 + R)β = 1. The
farmer can also buy or sell land in an internal competitive market at price Qt, where the
consumption good is used as the numeraire. The internal market restriction implies that
only farmers can participate in the land market.
The key element of this model is that farmers face borrowing constraints in the world
market. Let Bt+1 be the amount of seed borrowed by the farmer in period t in the world
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market. Kocherlakota consider two types of borrowing constraints:
• Exogenous Credit Constraint: The farmer cannot borrow more than a fixed amount
of debt B∗.
Bt+1 ≤ B∗ (3.2.4)
• Endogenous Credit Constraint: The farmer can borrow up to the value of his land-
holdings next period. Thus, farmers indulge in collateralized borrowing, using their
land as collateral for their loans. Farmers may repudiate their contracts and not pay
back the loan they took from the world markets. Lenders, foreseeing the possibility
of repudiation, are not willing to lend a sum greater than the collateral posted by the
farmer. That way if the farmer fails to pay his debt, the lender can seize the farmer’s
land. This condition is formalized as:
Bt+1 ≤ QtLt+1 (3.2.5)
In the economy described above, the farmer has perfect foresight about the sequence of
land prices {Qt} and solves the following optimization problem:
max
(C,X,L,B)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 ln(Ct) (3.2.6)
subject to:
Ct +Xt+1 +QtLt+1 +Bt(1 +R) = F (Xt, Lt) +Bt+1 +QtLt (3.2.7)
Bt+1 ≤ B∗ or Bt+1 ≤ QtLt+1 (3.2.8)
0 ≤ Ct, Xt (3.2.9)
where his initial seed X1 and level of debt B1 are given. An equilibrium would be fully
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characterized by a set of sequences (Q,C,X,B) such that (C,X,B) and Lt = 1 solve the
farmer’s problem, taking Q as given.
3.2.1 Kocherlakota with Exogenous Constraint
Now let us characterize the steady state of this economy. The first order condition for the
optimality of seed planted implies that:
βFX(Xss, 1) = 1 (3.2.10)
Suppose that a farmer starts out at a level of seed Xss. Since the interest rate is exactly
offset by his discount factor (1 + R)β = 1, he will want to keep his consumption constant.
In order to satisfy the budget constraint he will have to keep his debt level constant; that is
he will pay the interest on his debt, but never the principal. Thus if we start our economy
at (B1, Xss), then we are guaranteed to stay there if and only if:
B1 = Bss ≤ B∗ (3.2.11)
βFX(Xss, 1) = 1 (3.2.12)
The steady state value of consumption is implied by the budget constraint, while the
steady state value of output comes from the production function:
Css = F (Xss, 1)−Xss −BssR (3.2.13)
Yss = F (Xss, 1) (3.2.14)
In this section, the objective is to study the effect of a negative shock on the economy.
In particular we are interested in the degree of amplification and persistence that a negative
shock has on output, prices and consumption.
Let us suppose that the economy starts out in steady state, and that at time t = 1
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the economy experiences a negative output shock of magnitude ∆. The agents in this
economy did not expect this shock (i.e. they deemed a reduction in output as impossible).
Moreover, we will assume that the steady state value of debt is equal to the maximum
value that the farmers are allowed to borrow i.e. Bss = B∗. We make this assumption
because we are interested in the behavior of the economy when the constraint binds. If the
maximum amount of debt that the farmers are allowed to borrow is significantly greater
than the steady state value of debt, then small shocks will not force the farmer to reach the
borrowing constraint.
Once the shock hits the economy the following equalities must be satisfied for the equi-
librium sequences of consumption, and seed that bring the economy back to steady state.
C−1t = α1βC
−1
t+1X
α1−1
t+1 (3.2.15)
Ct +Xt+1 +RB∗ = Xα1t − 1t=1∆ (3.2.16)
X1 = Xss (3.2.17)
Along this path the debt constraint will always bind, as the farmer would like to borrow
more, but he cannot. If ∆ is small, the system above is well approximated by the following
log-linear approximation 1:
ct = ct+1 + (1− α1)xt+1 (3.2.18)
ctCss/Xss + xt+1 = β
−1xt (3.2.19)
for t > 1 and for t = 1:
c1Css/Xss + x2 = −∆/Xss (3.2.20)
where (ct, xt) = (log(Ct/Css), log(Xt/Xss)). Equations (3.6.10) and (3.2.19) describe a
1See Appendix for a derivation of the log-linear approximation
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first order linear system that map (ct, xt) onto (ct+1, xt+1) for all t > 1. The characteristic
polynomial of the transition matrix has two real distinct roots (one of which is stable and
one which is unstable). Moreover, we show that the stable root γ ∈ [α1, 1). The paths
associated with the unstable root violate the transversality condition, thus we can ignore
it. Hence by intersecting the eigenspace associated with γ and the locus of possible initial
conditions given by (3.2.20) we can find a unique path through which the economy goes
back to steady state.
Once the path has been pinned down a simple calculation shows that y2 = −γ∆/Yss.
Using the fact that log(y2) ≈ (Y2− Yss)/Yss we can see that (Y2− Yss)/∆ = −γ. Thus, the
degree of amplification would be well approximated by γ.
The degree of “amplification” γ generated by the economy will be defined as the ratio
of the difference in output in the second period minus the steady state value of output, to
the size of the output shock:
Y2 − Yss
∆
= γ (3.2.21)
This definition captures the idea, that if a shock of size ∆ reduces output in the economy,
by which amount will the structure of the economy amplify that shock in the subsequent
period.
Therefore, the value of γ completely characterizes the behavior of this economy with
exogenous constraints, as it captures both the degree of amplification, as well as the degree
of persistence. Since the value of γ is bounded above by 1, then the shock to farmer’s
income does not get amplified at all.
The degree of “persistence” ρ generated by the economy will be defined as the rate
at which output goes back to steady state after the shock hits the economy, i.e:
Yt − Yss
Yss
= ρ
Yt−1 − Y ss
Y ss
(3.2.22)
For every t > 3.
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3.2.2 Kocherlakota with Endogenous Constraint
We now turn to the case in which the farmer cannot borrow more than the value of the
land. We expect the degree of amplification to be greater in this case. This is because
once the shock hits the economy the farmer will have to reduce the amount of seed planted
in comparison to the steady state value. Since the production function exhibits comple-
mentarity between land and seed, we expect the price of land to fall. Intuitively, the price
of land should reflect the discounted stream of payoffs coming from an extra unit of land.
The marginal output of land is reduced now that there is a lower amount of seed. Since
the price of land falls, then the credit constraint tightens. With a lower debt capacity, the
farmer will further reduce the amount of seed planted, which will in turn lead to a decrease
in the price of land. Therefore, there is a multiplier effect relating the debt capacity with
the income shock.
As in the case with exogenous constraint, we assume that the initial level of debt is such
that the debt constraint holds with equality. That is, we will start this economy with levels
of seed X1 = Xss and of debt B1 = Bss such that:
1 = βFX(X1, 1) (3.2.23)
B1 = βFL(X1, 1)/(1− β) (3.2.24)
The equilibrium evolution of (Ct, Xt, Qt) for this case follows the system of equations
determined by the resource constraint (3.2.25), and the first order conditions with respect
to seed (3.2.26) and land (3.2.27):2
Ct = F (Xt, 1) +Qt −Xt+1 − (1 +R)Qt−1 (3.2.25)
1
Ct−1
=
β
Ct
FX(Xt, 1) (3.2.26)
2See Appendix for a formal derivation of these equations
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FL(Xt, 1) +Qt = Qt−1(1 +R) (3.2.27)
For t > 1, and the resource constraint at t = 1:
C1 = F (Xss, 1) +Q1 −X2 − (1 +R)Qss −∆ (3.2.28)
We can now proceed to log-linearize these equations about the steady state, again using
the convention that (ct, xt, qt) = (log(Ct/Css), log(Xt/Xss), log(Qt/Qss)):
c1 = c2 + (1− α1)x2 (3.2.29)
qtβ
−1Qss = qt+1Qss + α2β−1xt+1Xss (3.2.30)
ct+1Css = xt+1Xssβ
−1 + qt+1Qss − β−1qtQss − xt+2Xss (3.2.31)
From the above equations we can solve for ct+1, qt+1 ,and xt+2 as a function of ct, qt and
xt+1. This determines a first order linear system that fully characterizes the evolution of
the economy:

1 0 −(1− α1)
0 1/β −(α2Xss)/(βQss)
−Css/Xss 0 1/β − α2/β + (1− α1)(Css/Xss)


ct
qt
xt+1
 =

ct+1
qt+1
xt+2
 (3.2.32)
This transition matrix has three distinct real eigenvalues: one is α1, a second is 1/β,
and the third is at least as large as 1/β. The latter two eigenvalues produce explosive paths
that violate the transversality condition. Therefore, we know the dynamics will evolve along
the eigenspace associated with the only stable eigenvalue α1. Hence, from our log-linear
approximation we can see that the level of persistence in this case will be given by α1.
Finally, we need to pin down the values of c1, q1 and x2 that will bring the economy back
to steady state. We can do that by using the log-linearized counterpart of (3.2.28):
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c1Css + x2Xss = q1Qss −∆ (3.2.33)
We now simply need to find the unique point of intersection between the eigenspace
associated with α1 (a line in <3) and the restriction imposed by the budget constraint
(3.2.33) at period t = 1 (A plane in <3).
The analytic expressions for the degree of amplification in this case are rather compli-
cated. However, Kocherlakota finds the following approximations:
Y2 − Y ss ≈ −α1(1− α1β)∆
1− α2 − α1β (3.2.34)
Q1 −Qss ≈ − α1(1− β)∆
1− α2 − α1β (3.2.35)
The degree of amplification in this case is increasing in α1 + βα2, and in theory one
can generate an arbitrarily high degree of amplification by bringing β, and α2 sufficiently
close to 1 and α1 close to 0. The problem with this result is that it is not robust to the
empirical evidence of factor shares in US data. That is, if we parameterize the production
function with another inelastically supplied factor like labor with a share of 0.6 the degree
of amplification is rather small. The table below3 shows the degree of amplification when
β = 0.97, and the sum of the shares of land and seed add up to 0.4.
3Taken from Kacherlakota 2000
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The degrees of amplification generated by these parameterizations are in the same ball-
park of those obtained with the exogenous constraint. Moreover, the degree of amplification
is well below one in all the cases, implying that the shock doesn’t get amplified. The fol-
lowing remark summarizes the results of Kocherlakota’s Model:
The amplification and persistence with the exogenous constraint is given by γ ∈ [α1, 1).
Therefore, the shock is not amplified at all. With the endogenous constraint the persistence
is given by α1 but the shock can be amplified to an arbitrarily high degree depending
on the factor shares in the production function. This yields the intuitive result that by
endogenizing the borrowing constraint one obtains higher levels of amplification, but the
economy returns to steady state at a faster rate.
In the next section we turn our attention to the case where the borrowing constraint
lies between the exogenous constraint and the endogenous constraint.
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3.3 The Model with Accounting Frictions
In this section we add some amount of “stickiness” to price at which land is accounted for
on the farmer’s balance sheet. In reality, not all financial institutions mark their assets to
market on a continuous basis. In particular, after the value of their assets declines, many
financial institutions might be reluctant to write down the value of their assets immediately.
Alternatively, they could pursue some form of face value accounting, in which they mark
the value of their assets for the price at which they bought them. That price can diverge
substantially from the price at which they can sell those assets (the current market price)
at a given time. This insight is of vital importance for markets which dry up.
During the 2008-2009 financial crisis the market for mortgage backed securities did
completely dry up, implying a market price of zero for these assets. Similarly, in the current
euro-crisis, many banks are reluctant to write down the value of the Greek debt they have
on their balance sheets. This is due both to the fact that they don’t want to realize these
losses, and because writing down assets might bring them closer to insolvency. In what
follows, we explore the implication of incorporating this friction into the benchmark model
of Kocherlakota, and studying the effect it has in the way that various macro-economic
variables react to shocks.
Mathematically, we model this friction on the asset side of the farmer’s balance sheet
by keeping track of some “historic” price of land denoted Qˆt. This historic price will evolve
according the following law of motion:
Qˆt = (1− λ)Qˆt−1 + λQt (3.3.1)
λ ∈ [0, 1] (3.3.2)
The coefficient λ captures the speed with which the accounting value of land Qˆt catches
up with the market value Qt. Therefore, high values of λ imply that assets are close to
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being marked to market, while low values of λ imply that the current market price of land
has little influence on the value at which these assets sit in the balance sheet. Low values
of λ in this context imply face value accounting practices.
The mechanism by which this friction is incorporated in the dynamics of the economy is
through the borrowing constraint that the agent faces. That is we replace (3.2.8) by (3.3.3):
Bt+1 ≤ Lt+1Qˆt (3.3.3)
This borrowing constraint says that the maximum amount the farmer can borrow from
the world markets is proportional to the value at which he values land in his balance sheet.
That is, the lender trusts the financial report of the farmer, and is willing to lend him an
amount proportional to his assets.
In reality, this is plausible because determining exactly the market value of a firm’s
assets is costly. The heterogeneity and complexity of assets makes it a difficult task for a
lender to value the worthiness of the assets he would seize if the lender were to repudiate
his debt, and declare bankruptcy. Thus, the borrowing constraint is sensitive to the firm’s
accounting practices; and the availability of credit is probably related to the reported value
of the asset side on the firm’s balance sheet. 4
The generalized borrowing constrain (3.3.3) simplifies to the case for the exogenous
constraint when λ = 0, and to the endogenous constraint when λ = 1. To see this we note
that:
• If λ = 0, then Q¯t = ¯Qt−1 = Qss for every t. Thus the borrowing constraint is
Bt+1 ≤ Qss, as in the case with the exogenous borrowing constraint.
• If λ = 1, then Q¯t = Qt for every t. Thus, the borrowing constraint is Bt+1 ≤ Qt, as
in the case with the endogenous borrowing constraint.
4For instance, not long before Enron filed for bankruptcy in late 2001 the firm still had good access to
credit. That is probably because lenders were trusting the firm’s financial statements, rather than looking
in detail at the market value of Enron’s assets.
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The general case for λ ∈ [0, 1]
The farmer takes the sequences of prices {Qt} as given, and the resulting sequence of {Qˆt}
implied by (3.3.1). He maximizes his utility subject to his new borrowing constrain given by
(3.3.3), and the standard budget constraint (3.2.7). As was done in the preceding section,
we start our economy at a steady state level of seed X1 = Xss and debt B1 = Bss such
that:
1 = βFX(X1, 1) (3.3.4)
B1 = βFL(X1, 1)/(1− β) (3.3.5)
At this level of debt and seed the price of land that clears the market is given by
Qss = Bss, and the price at which land is valued in the balance sheet is also given by
Qˆss = Bss = Qˆ0. Now at time t = 1 the farmer experiences a negative output shock
of magnitude ∆. The equilibrium evolution of (Ct, Xt, Qt, Q¯t) in this setting satisfies the
following system of equations.5 The resource constraint (3.3.6),
Ct = F (Xt, 1) +Qt −Xt+1 − (1 +R) ¯Qt−1 + Q¯t −Qt − 1t=1∆ (3.3.6)
the first order conditions for consumption (3.3.7), and land (3.3.8),
1
Ct
=
β(FX(Xt+1, 1))
Ct+1
(3.3.7)
β(FL(Xt+1, 1) +Qt+1)
Ct+1
+
Q¯t −Qt
Ct
=
Q¯t
Ct+1
(3.3.8)
and the law of motion for the historic price (3.3.9):
Qˆt = (1− λ) ˆQt−1 + λQt (3.3.9)
5See the Appendix for a formal derivation of this system of equations.
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For sufficiently small shocks, ∆, the log-linear approximation in percentage deviation
from the steady state values for t > 1 of the system above, is given by:
ctCss + xt+1Xss + (1 +R)qˆtQss = xtXss/β + qˆtQss (3.3.10)
ct = ct+1 + (1− α1)xt+1 (3.3.11)
qt
β
= qt+1 + xt+1
α2Xss
βQss
(3.3.12)
qˆt = (1− λ) ˆqt−1 + λqt (3.3.13)
We can now solve explicitly for future consumption ct+1, land prices qt+1, seed xt+1, and
historic prices qˆt as a linear function of their current counterparts ct,qt,xt,and ˆqt−1. Thus,
the dynamics are fully captured by a first order in time 4x4 linear system, which expressed
using matrix notation, takes the form:

1
β
λQss
Xss
−CssXss φ
−α2Xss
Qssβ2
1−α2λ
β
α2Css
Qssβ
−α2φXssβQss
α1−1
β
(α1−1)λQss
Xss
Xss+(1−α1)Css
Xss
φ(α1 − 1)
0 λ 0 1− λ


xt
qt
ct
ˆqt−1

=

xt+1
qt+1
ct+1
qˆt

(3.3.14)
where
φ =
Qss
Xss
[1− λ− β−1] (3.3.15)
We find that the transition matrix has four eigenvalues: one is β−1, a second is at
least as large as β−1, and the other two have absolute values between 0 and 1.6 Therefore,
our trajectory of the return to steady state will evolve along the span of the eigenvectors
associated with the stable eigenvalues. Mimicking the procedure of the previous section
6I am working on an analytic proof for this statement, but it is numerically true for various values of α1,
α2, and λ.
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we can show that the transition equations at time t = 1 impose two restrictions on the
tuple (x2, q2, c2, q¯1), which combined with the two restrictions coming from the two stable
eigenvalues, uniquely identify the starting point for the economy once the shock hits7.
Unfortunately, not much more can be said analytically to characterize the evolution of
this economy. We thus turn to numerical simulations for specific values of the parameter
space to try to gain further insight into the implications coming from the accounting friction
that we added to Kocherlakota’s benchmark model.
7There are four degrees of freedom, and four linear restrictions, so in principle we can find a unique
solution.
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3.4 Numerical Results
A number of questions remain concerning the economy’s response for different values of λ.
How does the persistence of the initial shock depend on λ, what is the relation between
the degree of amplification and the parameter λ? Are there values of λ for which we get a
cyclical response from the economy? and if so what is the periodicity of the cycle induced by
the shock? While some further analytic progress could be made (with increasing difficulty)
to answer these questions, it is more sensible at this point to turn to numerical simulations.
We select parameter values α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.7, β = 0.97, and ∆ = 0.013. The value
of β is calibrated to yield an annual interest rate of 3.1%. The value of ∆ is calibrated to
yield a negative shock of 2% of output. That is the farmer wakes up at time t = 1 with 2%
less output than he expected.
However, as mentioned, the values of α1 and α2 are not robust to historic U.S. data,
since labor makes up for a share of 0.6 of the production function, constraining the shares of
seed and land to add up to 0.4. Qualitatively the behavior of the results we show below are
not affected by this choice of α1 and α2. However, the quantitative effects are substantially
lowered if we restrict ourselves to α1 + α2 = 0.4, making it difficult from the graph to tell
apart the various trajectories generated when λ varies.
In the following two subsections we illustrate the results for two particular cases: when
λ = 0.5, and when λ = 0.
The case when λ = 0.5
Here we simulate the trajectories that consumption, land prices, seed, and output would
take in the return to steady state. For illustrative purposes, we assume without loss of
generality that the shock takes place at time t = 5. The sole purpose of this is to permit
the reader to observe the way the economy behaved prior to the shock, and how it reacts
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Figure 3.4.1: Output
once the shock hits the economy graphically.
Figure 3.4.1 depicts the path of output when λ = 0 and when λ = 0.5, in percentage
deviations from the steady-state value of output.8 In both cases the initial shock reduces
output by 2 percent. However, that the degree of amplification for the case λ = 0.5 is
greater. In both cases the degree of amplification is greater than one, the deviation of
output from its steady state value is amplified in the period subsequent to when the shock
hits the economy. In the case of λ = 1 output bottoms out at -2.9 %, while in the case
of λ = 0.5 it bottoms out at around -3.6 %. At this point we do not have an intuitive
explanation as to why the amplification increases when we introduce this friction in the
value of the price of land.
The degree of persistence for the case of λ = 1 is α2 = 0.2. The shock disappears rapidly,
and output is “effectively” back to its steady state value 4 periods after the shock. On the
other hand, the persistence for the case λ = 0.5 is 0.56 (the absolute value of the stable
eigenvalues). Output takes about 9 periods to be “back” to its steady state value. This
8The case λ = 1 is equivalent to that of Kocherlakota with exogenous borrowing constraint
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result is very intuitive: by introducing the accounting friction the low price of land after
the shock hits stays in the balance sheet of the farmer, and prevents him from expanding
his borrowing capacity faster. Therefore, introducing this friction causes the economy to
take a lot longer to recover from negative shocks.
An important remark for this case is that the stable eigenvalues are 0.48 ± 0.28i. As
can be seen from the picture, this not only implies a higher degree of persistence, but
also a cyclical response coming from the imaginary part of the eigenvalues. This is a very
interesting feature that was not present in Kocherlakota’s model, and that is captured by
our model. After the shock impacts the economy, output doesn’t go back exponentially to
steady state. The response overshoots the steady state value, and then “returns” to steady
state. A more precise statement would be that output spirals about its steady state value
endlessly, however after the first cycle it has “effectively” returned to steady state.
Figure 3.4.2 depicts the trajectories of land prices under the two cases. Amplification
and persistence are both magnified by the introduction of the friction. Land prices react
contemporaneously to the shock with a reduction of 0.1% in the case of λ = 1, and of 0.22%
in the case of λ = 0.5. Land prices take about twice as long to return to steady state, and
exhibit the same pattern of cyclicality. Intuitively cycles arise from the fact that historic
prices don’t fall as much as market prices do, but they keep on falling until market prices
catch up with historic prices. Then historic prices start to rise, but not as fast as market
prices do. The introduction of this lag introduces some kind of “cat and mouse” game
between historic prices and market prices that for some values of λ generates cycles.
The case when λ = 0
Consider now the case when historic prices adjust infinitely slowly to changes in current
prices (i.e. λ = 0). Lowering λ from 0.5 to 0 has no effect in amplification (See figures
3.4.3 and 3.4.4). Moreover, the stable eigenvalue in this is case is 0.54. Thus, the degree
of persistence in comparison to that of the case when λ = 0.5 is the same. However, the
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Figure 3.4.2: Land Prices
eigenvalue is now real, and neither output nor land prices exhibit cyclicality. Output doesn’t
overshoot, but instead slowly goes back to steady state. 9
The Frequency and Period of the Business Cycle
Cycles were not present in either of Kocherlakota’s cases (i.e when λ = 0 or when λ = 1).
However, for the case of λ = 0.5 cyclical behavior emerged. Thus, one natural question to
ask is: How does the frequency (and period) of the business cycle change as a function of
the parameter λ? To answer this question we need to look at the imaginary part of the
eigenvalues of the transition matrix. We resort to spherical coordinates to be able to clearly
separate the periodicity from the persistence of the response. That is we find r < 1 and θ
such that for eigenvalue Λ = a+ bi the following equality is satisfied:
Λ = a+ bi = reiθ (3.4.1)
9This case should simplify to that of Kocherlakota with exogenous constraint. The degree of persistence
we obtain is the same as that in Kocherlakota, but the degree of amplification is much greater. This suggests
that we may be making a mistake in the code or the derivation of the equations.
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Figure 3.4.3: Output
Figure 3.4.4: Land Prices
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Figure 3.4.5: Frequency of the Business Cycle
From here is straight forward to see that after t periods the eigenvalue will decrease
geometrically in magnitude at rate r, and that the frequency of the oscillations will be
given by θ. That is:
Λt = rteiθt (3.4.2)
Figure 3.4.5 depicts θ as a function of λ. Cyclical behavior emerges for values of λ just
below 0.2. The frequency of the cycles increases monotonically with λ until 0.9, after which
it decreases swiftly and we return to no cycles at λ = 1.
Figure 3.4.6 plots instead of the frequency the period of the cycles a function of λ. For
the regions in the parameter space in which there are no cycles this is equivalent to saying
that the period is infinitely long. In the region of λ between 0.2 and 0.9 the period reduces
monotonically to reach a low of about 8 years/cycle. The interesting point is that his value
is remarkably close to the estimated values in the data for the length of the business cycle
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Figure 3.4.6: Period of the Business Cycle
in postwar data10. As λ gets very close to 1, the period of the cycle goes to infinity and
cyclical behavior dissapear when λ reaches 1.
10Eickstein and Sinai (1991) estimate 5 full cycles between the end of WWII and 1983. This gives an
average of about 8 years for a full cycle
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3.5 Conclusions and Extensions
Models with credit constraints have succeeded in generating fluctutations in ouput that
exhibit the same characteristics that we observe in the data: amplification, persistence,
and downward bias. This model illustrates how the interaction of credits constraints with
accounting frictions (arising from non mark-to-market accounting practices) can enhance
these mechanisms. Moreover, accounting frictions seem to play an important role in the
cyclical nature of the response of the economy to downward shocks. The above analysis
has consequences in regards to regulatory policy, and the cost benefit analysis of various
accounting practices.
Future extensions of this work should embed this model into a stochastic general equi-
librium frame-work, in which agents have rational expectations about the external shocks.
It would of interest to see if the results of this model extend to this more realistic setting.
Finally, one would like to bring this model to the data, and see if there are differences in
the estimated impulse response functions of countries that have different accounting rules.
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3.6 Appendix
Log-linear approximation
Here we show how to obtain the log-linear approximation to the transition equations.
Consider (3.2.15); defining F (Ct) and G(Ct+1, Xt+1) as the LHS and RHS respectively:
F (Ct) = C
−1
t = α1βC
−1
t+1X
α1−1
t+1 = G(Ct+1, Xt+1) (3.6.1)
Since all quantities are positive we can express Ct = e
ln(Ct), Ct+1 = e
ln(Ct+1), and
Xt+1 = e
ln(Xt+1). We take logs on both sides, and then a first order Taylor approximations
on the LHS with respect to ct = ln(Ct)− ln(Css). This is a good approximation for a small
deviation from steady state in percentage terms:
ln(F (Ct)) = ln(F (e
ln(Ct)) (3.6.2)
≈ ln(F (eln(Css)) + F
′(eln(Css))
F (eln(Css))
eln(Css)ct (3.6.3)
= ln(F (Css)) +
F ′(Css)
F (Css)
Cssct (3.6.4)
Similarly for the RHS:
ln(G(Ct+1, Xt+1)) = ln(G(e
ln(Ct+1), eln(Xt+1))) (3.6.5)
≈ ln(G(eln(Css), eln(Xss))) + GC(.)
G(.)
Cssct+1 +
GX(.)
G(.)
Xssxt+1 (3.6.6)
= ln(G(Css, Xss)) +
GC(.)
G(.)
Cssct+1 +
GX(.)
G(.)
Xssxt+1 (3.6.7)
Now by definition of steady state we have that:
ln(F (Css)) = ln(G(Css, Xss)) (3.6.8)
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Using (3.6.8) we obtain that:
F ′(Css)
F (Css)
Cssct =
GC(.)
G(.)
Cssct+1 +
GX(.)
G(.)
Xssxt+1 (3.6.9)
Evaluating the derivatives of F and G gives us
ct = ct+1 + (1− α1)xt+1 (3.6.10)
as desired. A similar/identical procedure allows us to obtain the log-linear approximation
to the other equation of the system.
Derivation of the transition equations for the case with endogenous con-
straint
We can formulate the farmer’s problem via a Dynamic Programming approach. We
consider a Value Function V (Xt, Lt, Bt) that returns the amount of utility the farmer can
achieve taking the sequence of prices {Qt} as given, and for values of Xt, Lt, Bt such that
the constraint Bt+1 = QtLt+1 is binding. The latter is precisely the case after the shock
hits the economy in steady state. Thus V (Xt, Lt, Bt) must satisfy:
V (Xt, Lt, Bt) = max
(Ct,Xt+1,Lt+1,Bt+1)
{ln(Ct) + βV (Xt+1, Lt+1, Bt+1)} (3.6.11)
subject to:
Ct = F (Xt, Lt) +QtLt −QtLt+1 −Xt+1 − (1 +R)Bt +Bt+1 (3.6.12)
Bt+1 = QtLt+1 (3.6.13)
Substituting out for Bt+1 using (3.6.13), the problem simplifies to:
V (Xt, Lt, Bt) = max
(Xt+1,Lt+1)
{ln(Ct) + βV (Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1)} (3.6.14)
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where
Ct = F (Xt, Lt) +QtLt −Xt+1 − (1 +R)Bt (3.6.15)
The first order conditions for optimality with respect to Xt+1 and Lt+1 imply:
1
Ct
= βVX(Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1) (3.6.16)
VL(Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1) = −QtVB(Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1) (3.6.17)
The Envelope Theorem for each of the state variables yields:
VX(Xt, Lt, Qt−1Lt) =
1
Ct
FX(Xt, Lt) (3.6.18)
VL(Xt, Lt, Qt−1Lt) =
FL(Xt, Lt) +Qt
Ct
(3.6.19)
VB(Xt, Lt, Qt−1Lt) = −1 +R
Ct
(3.6.20)
Combining the Envelope Condition for optimality of seed (3.6.18), with the first order
condition for seed (3.6.16) we obtain:
1
Ct
=
β(FX(Xt+1, Lt+1))
Ct+1
(3.6.21)
Pushing forward one period, and substituting (3.6.19) and (3.6.20) into (3.6.17):
FL(Xt+1, Lt+1) +Qt+1 = Qt(1 +R) (3.6.22)
Imposing the equilibrium condition Lt = 1, the equations above are equivalent to
(3.2.25), (3.2.26), and (3.2.27) as desired.
Derivation of the transition equations for the general case
Mimicking the previous calculation we posit a Value Function V (Xt, Lt, Bt) that returns
the amount of utility the farmer can achieve taking the sequence of prices {Qt}, and {Qˆt}
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as given, and for values of (Xt, Lt, Bt) such that the constraint Bt+1 = QˆtLt+1 is binding.
For this general case V (Xt, Lt, Bt) must satisfy:
V (Xt, Lt, Bt) = max{Ct,Xt+1,Lt+1,Bt+1}
{ln(Ct) + βV (Xt+1, Lt+1, Bt+1)} (3.6.23)
subject to:
Ct = F (Xt, Lt) +QtLt −QtLt+1 −Xt+1 − (1 +R)Bt +Bt+1 (3.6.24)
Bt+1 = QˆtLt+1 (3.6.25)
Qˆt = (1− λ) ˆQt−1 + λQt (3.6.26)
Substituting out for Bt+1 using (3.6.25), the problem simplifies to:
V (Xt, Lt, Bt) = max{Xt+1,Lt+1}
{ln(Ct) + βV (Xt+1, Lt+1, Q¯tLt+1)} (3.6.27)
where
Ct = F (Xt, Lt) +QtLt −Xt+1 − (1 +R)Bt + Q¯tLt+1 −QtLt+1 (3.6.28)
and
Qˆt = (1− λ) ˆQt−1 + λQt (3.6.29)
The first order conditions for optimality with respect to Xt+1 and Lt+1 imply:
1
Ct
= βVX(Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1) (3.6.30)
Q¯t −Qt
Ct
+ βVL(Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1) = −Q¯tVB(Xt+1, Lt+1, QtLt+1) (3.6.31)
The Envelope Theorem for each of the state variables yield:
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VX(Xt, Lt, Qt−1Lt) =
1
Ct
FX(Xt, Lt) (3.6.32)
VL(Xt, Lt, Qt−1Lt) =
FL(Xt, Lt) +Qt
Ct
(3.6.33)
VB(Xt, Lt, Qt−1Lt) = −1 +R
Ct
(3.6.34)
Combining the Envelope Condition for optimality of seed (3.6.32), with the first order
condition for seed (3.6.30) we obtain:
1
Ct
=
β(FX(Xt+1, Lt+1))
Ct+1
(3.6.35)
Pushing forward one period, and substituting (3.6.33) and (3.6.34) into (3.6.31):
β(FL(Xt+1, Lt+1) +Qt+1)
Ct+1
+
Q¯t −Qt
Ct
=
Q¯t
Ct+1
(3.6.36)
Imposing the equilibrium condition Lt = 1, equations (3.6.35), (3.6.36), (3.6.24), and
(3.6.29) give us the system of equations we were looking for.
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